Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Theses

Theses

5-2008

The One-Eyed King: The Reforms of Ben Tillman
as the Reason for the Absence of Populism in South
Carolina
Kevin Krause
Clemson University, kmrock@bellsouth.net

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
Part of the United States History Commons
Recommended Citation
Krause, Kevin, "The One-Eyed King: The Reforms of Ben Tillman as the Reason for the Absence of Populism in South Carolina"
(2008). All Theses. 314.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/314

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized
administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.

THE ONE-EYED KING: THE REFORMS OF BEN TILLMAN AS THE REASON
FOR THE ABSENCE OF POPULISM IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
History

by
Kevin Michael Krause
May 2008

Accepted by:
Dr. H. Roger Grant, Committee Chair
Dr. Rod Andrew
Dr. Alan Grubb

ABSTRACT
This thesis is intended to demonstrate the tangible reforms initiated by Benjamin
Ryan Tillman between 1885 and 1895 for farmers and other citizens of South Carolina.
After exploring the most notable historiography surrounding the Tillman era in South
Carolina, the thesis examines Tillman’s appeals to the farmers’ depressed condition, the
establishment of Clemson Agricultural College, and state-level reforms of business and
government institutions. Tillman’s restructuring of the South Carolina Penitentiary, the
Lunatic Asylum, and the creation of the state liquor dispensary are shown to be
significant accomplishments in the reformer’s political career. Tillman’s assaults on
what he perceived as monopolistic capital—in the form of the phosphate mining industry
and the railroads—are also thoroughly discussed.
The emphasis of this analysis is to show that Tillman’s reform movement, and not
the concerns over white solidarity that stigmatized any third-party movement, was the
primary reason for the lack of a Populist party in South Carolina. The fact that Tillman
and the majority of white Democrats in South Carolina did not support the socio-political
equality of African Americans is not in question. However, the purpose of this thesis is to
illustrate that without Tillmanism and the real reforms that came along with the
movement, South Carolina would have experienced a significant third-party bolt similar
to other Southern and Western states in the 1890’s.
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HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE TILLMAN MOVEMENT

In 1892 the emergence of the Populist Party challenged the two-party system that
has dominated politics in the United States. Growing out of the National Farmers’
Alliance and Industrial Union, an organization of farmers who sought government
amelioration of the system that kept agricultural producers in perpetual poverty, the
Populists drew their ranks from former Democrats and Republicans primarily in the
South and West. While the Populists never broke the grip of the two traditional parties in
their respective regions, they did win a significant number of state offices and sent
several representatives to Washington. From 1892 to 1896 Populist activity was visible
across almost every Southern and Western state and territory—the exception was South
Carolina. The Palmetto State saw no noteworthy move to the People’s Party, even
though agricultural conditions there were just as critical, and Farmer’s Alliance activity
was just as busy as in any other state.1
The predominant reason given by historians for the relative absence of Populism
in South Carolina—a reason that is incomplete and overstated—has been based in
conservatism and white supremacy. In order to compete successfully with Democrats
and Republicans, Populists, especially in the South, relied on African American voters to
swing the vote in their direction. The customary reason supplied for South Carolina’s
1
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rejection of Populism is that, despite the farmers’ discontent, they were adamantly against
any cooperation with blacks that might put the two races on equal political and social
grounds. South Carolinians were obstinately opposed to allowing black voters to decide
a contest between two whites. Although it is true that the majority of whites did not
welcome African-American political participation, it is the objective of this thesis to
reassess the importance of the racial factor in the politics of South Carolina during
Populism’s zenith.
Another reason for Democratic solidarity in South Carolina, as or more important
than black participation, was the role that Ben Tillman played as a symbol of reform.
Tillman and his supporters created the Farmers’ Association (also known as Reform
Democrats) two years before the Farmers’ Alliance entered the state. Tillman was a
flamboyant, hard-charging “dirt farmer” who railed against the Bourbon leaders of the
state. He eventually usurped the Conservative leadership, and his election as governor
proved both a real and symbolic victory for the poor white farmers who identified with
him. It was the victory of Tillmanism in 1890, which many perceived as revolutionary,
that precluded a need for Populism in 1892. Tillman provided the lower class of farmers
with an outlet for their revolt within the Democratic Party. There was no need to bolt the
party when their own party had been “reformed.” While “Negrophobia” was definitely a
factor in South Carolina politics, the reform measures and the symbolic revolution of
Tillmanism over the Conservative regime were the most important reasons for the
scarcity of Populist support in the state.

2

The scholars who have recently examined South Carolina history during the
height of Tillmanism in the 1890’s are essentially in agreement on Benjamin Tillman’s
character and the polarizing role he played in the state’s political and social life. They
rightly focus on his fiery blustering against Bourbon elites on behalf of farmers, his
unabashed racism, and his political machinations that kept him in high office from 1890
until his death in 1918. One particular conclusion on which historians concur is the
notion that Tillman’s appeals to white supremacy and Democratic solidarity to white
citizens, were the driving factors behind the absence and seeming irrelevance of the
People’s Party in South Carolina, during a time when many people across the South and
West were bolting for the third party. Furthermore, scholars have maintained that the
Tillman movement was basically a sham, relying on empty class antagonisms and
demagoguery to further Tillman’s personal ambitions to power.
Walter Edgar, in his comprehensive work, South Carolina: A History, devotes an
entire chapter to Benjamin Tillman. While he does not directly address the Populist
movement—possibly because the third party never made any significant headway into
the state—he does make clear his position on Tillman’s calls for white supremacy and his
voracious appetite for political power. Of the 1886 Farmer’s Convention in Columbia,
which was ostensibly a meeting to organize and make demands of the legislature on
behalf of the downtrodden farmers, Edgar insists that the convention was obviously
“being molded into a political machine to further the ambitions of Ben Tillman.”2 For

2

Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press,
1998), 434.
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Edgar, this is merely the first example of Tillman using popular discontent to further his
own designs on political power.
Edgar also contradicts unspecified previous historians who interpreted the
election of 1890, in which Ben Tillman won the governor’s office, and the election of
many other Tillmanites to the state legislature, as a class struggle and subsequent
revolution of the agrarian sector against conservative aristocrats. Tillman had won the
Democratic nomination for Governor in 1890 by way of the famous “Shell Manifesto,”
which expounded the farmer’s grievances and called for a March convention of farmers
that would “suggest” candidates to the regular party convention.3 Edgar, however,
contends that Tillman’s victory was no revolution, that there was no “groundswell of
debtors and poor whites backing the Reform ticket.”4 Edgar maintains that the Tillman
movement was able to oust the Bourbons, the conservative leaders who were descendants
of the antebellum elites, through “assistance of some of the elite and a goodly portion of
the state’s upper middle class.”5 According to Edgar, the paramount reason Tillman
benefited from these votes was fear on the part of whites that black voters might decide
the contest between two white candidates. This same apprehension of blacks deciding
elections between whites is often cited as the reason why South Carolinians did not
support Populism. Additionally, he downplays the role of the Farmer’s Alliance (the
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Edgar, 435; see also John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and
the People’s Party (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1931) 171; Francis Butler
Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian with a new Introduction by Orville Vernon
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agrarian organization that precipitated the formation of the Populist Party in 1892) in
aiding Tillman’s election, even though the Alliance had a significant following in the
state, and had endorsed Tillman’s candidacy.6 According to Tillman’s most notable
biographer, by 1888, two years before Tillman’s election, the “Farmer’s Alliance . . . had
already won the active support of many South Carolina farmers of the class-conscious
type to whom Tillman appealed.”7
Although Edgar does acknowledge the physical suffering of South Carolina
farmers and the organizations that attempted to ameliorate them, he insists that white
solidarity was the key to Tillman’s success and the subsequent locked door against thirdparty radicalism. While Edgar is a popular historian and has produced a well-researched
and well-written history of the state, in this writer’s opinion he is mistaken to disregard
the farmer’s movement and to emphasize Tillman’s “empty” rhetoric in explaining the
success of the Tillman movement. He has de-emphasized the white farmers’ outrage
against deflation, crop liens, exorbitant shipping rates, and the like—as well as their class
antagonism against the ruling elites, and the upcountry resentment of low-country
planters—in favor of white supremacy and party loyalty. Edgar, however, is not the only
historian, nor the most adamant, to make this argument.
In his introduction to the newest edition of Francis B. Simkins’ seminal biography
of “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman, Orville Vernon Burton declares that Tillman’s principal
legacy was born not of the persecuted farmers whom he championed, “but from the
persecution he—in league with the whites he mobilized—imposed on African
6
7
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Americans.”8 While this assessment is neither untrue nor unfair—Tillman was most
definitely a racist who worked to disenfranchise blacks—it also overlooks the violent
discontent among the lower class white farmers that was just as real and significant to the
state’s socio-political climate as was Tillman’s bigotry. Burton also brings attention to
Tillman’s political appointees. As the “state’s undisputed political boss,” Tillman
replaced Bourbon Democrat officials with his favorite lieutenants, who were mostly
attorneys, and not the “wool-hat boys’ and other poor men who made up the rank and file
of Tillman’s supporters.”9 Burton echoes Walter Edgar’s assessment that the leaders of
Tillman’s farmers’ movement “were anything but dirt farmers.”10 The implication is that
Tillman was simply a political boss, that he was uninterested in true reform for whites or
blacks, and that he would never cede power to radicals such as Populists when he could
control the state without them. Both historians point out the fact that Tillman did not
appoint any of the lower class farmers he represented to high offices, as though it is an
elucidation of his duplicity. They do not, however, recognize that Tillman could
genuinely be working for their betterment without giving positions to under-educated,
often illiterate farmers who would have been woefully unqualified for government work.
No author stresses the primacy of white supremacy in all political matters during
Tillman’s time as much as Stephen Kantrowitz. He writes of Tillman’s thought that
“racial equality was an oxymoron; one race or another would dominate, and if white men
failed to rally together, their households would be invaded or subjugated by hostile
8

Orville Vernon Burton, introduction to Pitchfork Ben Tillman, by Francis B. Simkins
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), xiv.
9
Ibid., xxii.
10
Edgar, 438.

6

forces.”11 Kantrowitz places the failure of the Populist Party to thrive in South Carolina
squarely on the white supremacy espoused by Ben Tillman. Although the Tillman
movement was supposedly a “Reform” crusade, Kantrowitz insists that since the end of
Reconstruction Tillman and his ilk had systematically “establish[ed] the limits of
insurgent politics” by weeding out dissidents and radicals from the ranks of true white
men.12 Therefore, the only people with any voice of influence in South Carolina politics
were those who would refuse any talk of appealing to the African-American vote.
Kantrowitz argues that the third-party movement supported by many of the
Alliance members was an even bigger threat to Tillmanism than the bolters who had
supported A.C. Haskell in 1890. Populism, which would evidently require the votes of
African Americans to succeed, was anathema to Tillman. Along with the controversial
sub-treasury plan, which Tillman considered too socialistic, Tillman mainly fought
against the racial equality that populism inherently suggested. According to Kantrowitz,
Tillman believed it erroneous to attempt to “fight the ‘money power’ by forming a
coalition with its chief allies, black Republicans and the federal government.”13
Kantrowitz does not hold Tillman solely responsible for the defeat of the Populist
movement in South Carolina. He suggests, however, that the few Populists in the state,
such as Hendrix McLane, were defeated because of the “shared sense of privilege that all
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too few white men could bear to surrender.”14 Kantrowitz posits the theory that white
Democrats viewed black political participation as the precursor to political and social
domination. In South Carolina, the only state with a black majority, this idea was
extremely upsetting to all white citizens.15 Therefore, the Populists’ threat of cooperation
with blacks and splitting the Democratic Party were more than white South Carolinians
could stomach. If we accept the arguments of Kantrowitz and others, then we must
believe that popular white sentiment, along with Ben Tillman’s demagoguery, was strong
enough to convince South Carolina farmers that they were better off with the miserable
status quo than with promising programs that might also put them on equal standing with
blacks.
Another idea, however, is that Ben Tillman’s rhetoric and tangible efforts
focusing on the needs of white farmers and the evils of the Bourbon aristocrats were
enough to prove to his constituents that bolting for a third party was unnecessary—that
their needs were being addressed within their own party. It should be made clear,
however, that this critique of the previously mentioned scholars is not intended to deemphasize, or to justify in any way, the strong white-supremacist attitudes held by
Tillman and the vast majority of white South Carolinians in the late nineteenth century.
Tillman’s home county of Edgefield was a hotbed of anti-black activity that became
organized as Democratic clubs, agricultural societies, and rifle clubs during
Reconstruction. The main objective of these organizations was to use whatever means
14
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necessary to deprive blacks of their recently gained political rights.16 While holding
office in Columbia Tillman openly defended the lynching of black men accused of raping
white women. His racial attitudes are conveniently summarized in the following
statement: “I don’t care what you believe, but I know God didn’t make the nigger of as
good clay as he made me. What has he done for himself, or for civilization? . . .
Whatever the niggers have today they got through slavery.”17
The fact that Tillman was driven by a vicious racist ideology is not in dispute, and
the authors discussed here are correct to denounce Tillman and the Democratic Party of
South Carolina for their policies regarding race. Nevertheless, scholars dealing with
South Carolina during Tillman’s era have emphasized white supremacy so much that they
have neglected the fact that Tillman was indeed an agricultural and class reformer in the
view of many white South Carolinians. In fact, Tillman as a symbol of reform and class
revolt was just as significant to the dearth of Populist activity in the state as were appeals
to white supremacy and Democratic solidarity. To understand the role Tillman played in
state politics and social reform it is crucial to examine the many ways in which he came
to symbolize reform, and in some notable instances, achieved tangible benefits for the
agricultural classes. We must also, however, explore the conditions of the “farmers” in
the late nineteenth century, as well as the agricultural organizations that flourished in the
state and sought to advance the economic and social status of the farmer class.

16
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The devastation of the Civil War had left many southern landowners wholly or
nearly bankrupt. Without the benefit of slave labor that had sustained the Southern
plantation society, many lands were foreclosed to creditors or divided up among tenant
farmers and sharecroppers. South Carolina’s smaller farmers struggled with high credit
rates, tariffs, and new foreign competition for what was unfortunately their biggest export
crop, cotton. Farmers of the South and West were also held to higher shipping rates than
Eastern industries. Money was so scarce that farmers were forced to find credit through
merchants and solvent landowners.18 The South was developing industrially due to
Northern “carpetbag” investors, and an important segment of this “commercial
revolution” was a “dynamic class of town merchants who quickly established themselves
as important “middlemen” in the busy and expanding Upcountry cotton trade.”19 One of
the biggest disasters to the Southern economy was the wholesale reliance on cotton,
which trapped farmers in a cycle of dependence for food imports, rendered them
susceptible to fluctuating world markets, and dangerously depleted the soil while relying
heavily on imported fertilizers. Despite the drawbacks, Southern farmers continued to
increase cotton production. In the decade preceding 1890, cotton production in the South
Carolina Upcountry increased by over thirty percent, while corn cultivation grew by less
than fifteen percent.20 Subsequently, the South became essentially a one-crop producer,

18

Joseph Church, “The Farmers’ Alliance and the Populist movement in South Carolina,” (M.A.
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ironically dependent on outside areas for goods, like foodstuffs, that they could have been
easily producing on their own at much less cost.
One important reason why Southerners relied so heavily on cotton was that it was
one of the only crops for which they could receive credit. The scarcity of money and
banks in the South led farmers to seek credit for supplies through local town merchants.
Merchants did not lend money to farmers; instead they advanced goods the farmer
needed, in return for a lien on his upcoming crop.21 The merchant-loaners, with the help
of state lien laws, thereby were granted first claim on the farmer’s crop for payment of
the advanced supplies. An additional blow to the farmer’s purse was the practice of dual
pricing—whereby merchants charged one price for customers buying goods with cash,
and another higher price for those buying supplies on credit. Furthermore, merchants
collected cotton from debtor-farmers at harvest time, when the market was flooded and
prices were low. The farmer had no choice in this, but the merchant could hold on to the
crop if he wished, and sell it at a time when prices had risen. Under pressure from small
farmers, the South Carolina legislature abolished the lien law on January 1, 1878, but by
March of the same year it reinstated the lien system due to a total lack of other sources of
credit. Subsequently, by 1881 more than three quarters of all farms in South Carolina
had at least a partial lean on the crop.22 According to John D. Hicks, “the effect of crop
liens was to establish a condition of peonage throughout the cotton South.”23

21
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In concert with crop liens, high shipping rates, and exorbitant tariffs, factors of
nature inhibited harvests. As the result of drought, insect infestations, and subsequent
crop failures, thousands of farmers lost their land. In 1886 farmers unable to pay their
taxes forfeited roughly 954,000 acres of land.24 Farmers across the country decided on a
pro-active approach to bettering their condition. The Patrons of Husbandry, better known
as the Grange, was established in 1867 and reached South Carolina in 1871. Through the
prodding of Colonel D. H. Jacques, editor of the “Rural Carolinian,” D. Wyatt Aiken led
the state Grange.25 The primary goals of the Grange were to improve farming conditions
by the reform of railroad rates, establish a system of cooperative buying and selling,
lower tariffs, and increase the money supply through the printing of greenbacks.26 By
1875 there were at least 342 local chapters of the Grange active in South Carolina.
Indeed, the Palmetto state was the “leading Southern state in the Granger movement.”27
The Grange’s ascent in the state was matched only by the rapidity of its decline,
for in 1880 only ninety-eight Granges were still alive. The reasons for its demise were
manifold, but essentially the organization folded because of poor leadership, lack of
money for membership dues, and disagreement among the ranks over national policies.
In South Carolina the farmers were also preoccupied with “redeeming” their state from
the Reconstruction government.28 Despite the decline of the Granger movement, it is
manifest that farmers were unanimously discontented with their situation well before Ben

24
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Tillman became a state leader or the Populist Party was a consideration. Farmers were
looking for a solution to their plight, but the Grange, being strictly apolitical, was not
strong enough to succeed.
In the late 1880’s however, another farmers’ organization made even greater
headway into South Carolina: the Farmers’ Alliance. There were two Alliances, a
Northern and a Southern. Alongside the Southern Alliance was a parallel organization
for African Americans called the Colored Farmers’ Alliance. The Southern Alliance was
the most significant on the national scale, and merged with other organizations to become
known as the National Farmers’ Alliance and Industrial Union, which hereafter will be
simply termed the Farmers’ Alliance.29 The first branch, or sub-alliance, opened in South
Carolina in 1887 in Marion County, and by 1890 there were sixty thousand Alliance
members statewide. The first declaration of intention of the South Carolina Alliance was
to “labor for the education of the agricultural classes in the science of economical
government in a strictly non-partisan spirit.”30
Education was well organized in the Alliance; each state alliance and sub-alliance
had lecturers who taught the benefits of crop rotation, improved techniques and better
seed, and crop diversity. Information was also spread through many local newspapers
and magazines. The organization’s national newspaper was the National Economist,
edited by Alliance leader C.W. Macune in Washington D.C. The Alliance organ in South

29
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Carolina was the Cotton Plant.31 The success of agricultural literature was directly linked
to the farmers’ desire for immediate financial gain. According to historian Homer
Clevenger, “If better business management would increase their profits, they wanted to
know it. Their eagerness to have this kind of information was indicated by a growing
demand for farm magazines.”32
The South Carolina State Alliance justified its existence by taking on the
perceived enemies of the farmers. Subsequently, it staged well-organized boycotts of the
jute-bagging industry and the fertilizer trusts.33 One of the biggest draws to the Alliance
was the promise of economic improvement through cooperative stores. Through a wellorganized system of trade agents, South Carolina Alliancemen set up many cooperative
stores, grain elevators, cotton gins, and warehouses. These were an attempt to obtain
better prices for its members’ crops, provide lower prices on supplies, and to help
Alliance members escape the clutches of what they perceived as the parasitic lending
merchant. These cooperative ventures were initially quite successful, but they would not
become permanent institutions because of a severe shortage of capital.
One of the problems plaguing the Alliance from its inception was the internal
dilemma of whether or not it should become political. Officially the Alliance was
apolitical, but the organization decided to support individual candidates that favored its
issues, such as railroad regulation, opposition to monopolies and trusts, lower interest

31
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rates, and an increase of the money supply.34 The Alliance, however, was unable to
remain distant from politics for very long, and become more active in demanding that
their followers vote only for those candidates who subscribed to its platform. According
to historian Lacy K. Ford, in 1890 the South Carolina Alliance insisted its members
promote Alliance candidates, and “the Farmers’ Alliance, or Reform, Democrats became
the most powerful political faction in the state by 1892.”35 While Ford is correct to note
the influence of the Alliance in the state, he credits the movement too much to the
organization. Ben Tillman had begun a political reform movement for farmers, in the
form of the Farmers’ Association, two years before the Alliance entered the state.
One of the issues that the Alliance championed most fervently, at least until 1893,
was a proposed remedy to the credit and money supply problem known as the subtreasury. First presented in December 1889 at the Southern Alliance’s St. Louis meeting,
the sub-treasury plan called for government-owned facilities and storage warehouses to
be established in every county of each state that offered for sale five hundred thousand
dollars worth of agricultural goods on an annual basis. The products imagined were nonand semi-perishable crops like wheat, oats, rice, cotton, and tobacco. The farmer would
store his product in the sub-treasury facility, and then receive a loan in paper currency
issued by the Federal government worth eighty percent of his goods. The farmer could
wait (up to one year) and sell his product when market prices suited him, and then repay
the government at an interest rate of merely one percent.36
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Ben Tillman initially deprecated the plan, insisting that it was socialistic and
would create a huge and unnecessary branch of Federal government. Nevertheless, he
did reluctantly approve of the sub-treasury before the 1892 election. One may view this
as a strictly political move; Tillman may have considered endorsing the sub-treasury as
harmless since it would most likely never come to fruition, which it did not. It may also
be seen as proof that Tillman was not interested in plans that would actually boost the
economic status of poor farmers. What must also be noted is that the sub-treasury was
never unanimously agreed upon among the upper ranks of the Alliance. Even the
Alliance-backed Senator, Zebulon B. Vance from North Carolina, introduced a subtreasury bill to the Senate in 1890, and then decided that he could not support it himself.37
The Alliance was the most influential force behind the formation of the Populist
Party just before the elections of 1892. The national defeats suffered by the Populists in
1892, and the failed attempts at fusion in 1896 dealt a serious blow to the Populist Party
and the Farmers’ Alliance. By 1896 the influence of the Alliance in South Carolina, and
across the country, was on the wane. At the annual state convention in Columbia in
1896, thirteen counties went unrepresented.38 The failure of the third party had
stigmatized the Alliance, and its influence diminished significantly thereafter.
Nevertheless, the Farmers’ Alliance had organized, educated, and stirred into action
farmers all across the South and West—and South Carolina was no exception.
The most important realizations to glean from the large but relatively brief
successes of the Grange and the Alliance is that starting in the 1870’s there was serious
37
38
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and growing discontent among farmers in South Carolina. The farmers in South Carolina
felt the same about the “money powers” of the East, shipping rates, and currency supply
as did Georgians or Kansans. The primary difference was that no serious move towards
the Populist Party ever occurred in South Carolina, while other states saw Alliance
members bolting their traditional parties in significant numbers. Despite those historians
who have attributed this to a fear of allowing black voters to decide a contest between
whites, and therefore increasing the socio-political status of African Americans, there is
another legitimate reason for Populism’s failure in South Carolina. Ben Tillman had
started a tirade against the Bourbon leaders as early as 1885; his Farmers’ Association of
Reform Democrats provided an outlet of class rebellion among white farmers, without
the unwelcome necessity of switching parties. South Carolina did not suffer from a
greater case of Negrophobia than its neighboring Southern states. Although several
scholars have insisted that Tillman’s appeal to class-consciousness among poor whites
was nothing more than demagoguery and political bossism, the fact that he did win
support of poor farmers, who genuinely believed he was their champion, must be
recognized. Had Tillman not led a reform—symbolic, or actual—the farmers’ revolt in
South Carolina might have been drastically different.
In 1876, after a deal with national Republican leaders and what might be
described as a coup, Wade Hampton and other descendants of the state’s old, landed
families, reclaimed the state government and brought Reconstruction to an end. These
“Redeemers” (also called Bourbons and Conservatives) were different from their
counterparts in the other former Confederate states. Whereas the Redeemers of other
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Southern states were often young, former Whigs, with the goal of bringing industry and
Northern capital to their regions, the Wade Hampton regime was a true return to the
antebellum system. Land-ownership and agriculture were the business of the South
Carolina Bourbons. They ran the state with no interest in social or political progress, no
modernization or industrial buildup. The Conservative regime was true to its name.39
Ben Tillman, the future governor and senator from Edgefield County, was among
the most adamant among the ranks of those who helped redeem the state to this Bourbon
rule. Born in 1847, Tillman received a large chunk of land from his mother when he
came of age; his father had died when Benjamin was only two years old. By 1881 he
owned twenty-two hundred acres and employed thirty plow-hands, mostly former
slaves.40 Agriculture was Tillman’s beloved occupation, but he was also deeply involved
in the redemption movement during Reconstruction. As a member of the Sweetwater
Saber Club from 1873 to1877, Tillman helped terrorize potential black voters and was
involved in the infamous Hamburg massacre, in which at least six black militiamen were
murdered.41 Although Tillman had labored for the return of Wade Hampton’s regime,
by the mid-1880’s he was clearly unsatisfied with its rule, and subsequently began a
furious campaign for reform in favor of lower class farmers.
Tillman helped to found the Edgefield Agricultural Society in 1885. It was here
that he first began to polarize friends and enemies with his confrontational style of
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rhetoric and his domineering character. Tillman perceived grave mistakes being made by
farmers who were torturing the land with inefficient techniques, as well as a corrupt
government that was allegedly content to keep the mass of dirt farmers in perpetual
poverty. Tillman’s first public foray into criticizing the Bourbon regime came at
Bennettsville in 1885, at the annual meeting of the Grange and South Carolina
Agricultural and Mechanical Association.42 At Bennettsville Tillman violently
harangued the state leaders, accusing them of being “demagogues and lawyers in the pay
of finance.”43 Furthermore, he deprecated their ostensible attempts at aid to farmers—
such as the Agricultural Bureau and the agricultural department at the South Carolina
College—as “sops” and “bribes” intended to keep the farmers in their place.44 Although
state agricultural leaders were not much moved by his offer of five proposals to better
agricultural education, Tillman had definitely found a following. The hundreds of
farmers in the Bennettsville crowd thunderously cheered his attacks on the Conservative
regime; they loved his unpretentious manner, his fierce character, and his straight talk.
Even Narcisco G. Gonzales, a reporter for the Charleston News and Courier who would
later become one of Tillman’s staunchest enemies, wrote that, “Mr. Tillman defended his
resolutions in a speech full of hard sense, keen satire, and good-humored bandiage.”45 At
Bennettsville a reformer, or a demagogue, had indeed been born.
Tillman continued his attacks on the Bourbon establishment at the first of his
farmers’ conventions on April 29, 1886. Tillman created these annual conventions for
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dissatisfied farmers, but they also served as the political machine that eventually
propelled him to the highest office in the state. Although historians have dismissed
Tillman’s reform message and attacks on the Bourbons as political theatrics, it is
important to realize that Tillman was indeed a symbol of the lower class bitterness
towards the ruling elite. Tillman has been criticized for not really being a “dirt farmer”
as he suggested, and being in reality quite conservative.46 Nevertheless, it is mistaken to
dismiss dramatic rhetoric and posturing, because these were the tools by which Tillman
overthrew the Bourbons and prevented a potential third-party split. Tillman may not
have implemented any programs that could be termed “radical.” He did, however, make a
grand show of the frustrations of lower class farmers against the privileged class.
Tillman’s rough demeanor and salty tongue convinced thousands of actual dirt farmers
that somebody was fighting in their interest—he was a symbolic savior.
Tillman was a master at arousing the emotion of the white masses against
lawyers, corrupt politicians, and the landed gentry of the Lowcountry. His unkempt
clothing, untamed hair, and penchant for course language were crucial in the white
masses’ identification with him. A close friend of Tillman’s, the Reverend S.L. Morris,
described Tillman’s “conspicuous untidiness,” as well as his “tremendous head, and
bushy hair, which hung down to his shoulders.”47 Newspapers ill-disposed to the often
profane orator advised women to avoid Tillman’s campaign meetings for fear of “ having
their modesty shocked and their sex insulted.”48 Nevertheless, Benjamin Tillman
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enjoyed a mass following that identified with his style. According to Francis B. Simkins,
“farmers for the first time in the history of South Carolina were given the opportunity of
being led by one who looked at life from their angle, who was like them in personal
appearance, speech, and manners, and who expressed their ideals and prejudices.”49 Out
of the farmers’ conventions grew the Farmer’s Association, a group of Tillman’s
supporters also known as Reform Democrats, and later simply as Tillmanites. Tillman’s
ultimate political power may have benefited from calloused maneuvering and
uncompromising intra-party rule, but his popularity with the common folk was surely
based on his flamboyant attacks on the Bourbon regime.
Tillman symbolized the resentment of the populace against perceived
aristocrats—especially in the form of Upstate resentment of the Lowcountry. He derided
the South Carolina College, basically a liberal arts school with an insignificant
agricultural annex, as a haven for effete dandies. He and his Farmers’ Association
repeatedly called for The Citadel, the military college which he labeled a “dude factory,”
to be closed, and for its buildings to be used as an industrial college for girls.50
Obviously this proposal never came to fruition, but to dismiss the notions as the senseless
blustering of a demagogue is to miss the symbolic weight that it carried with common
people. In verbally assaulting The Citadel, Tillman was taking on the established
institution of socio-political hierarchy within the state. He may have been powerless to
implement his argument against the schools, but in establishing himself as an opponent of
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the historically conservative elite class, he set the stage for what appeared to be a
revolution when he won the governorship in 1890.
In January 1890 the president of the Farmer’s Association, G. W. Shell, published
the famous “Shell Manifesto,” a document likely penned by Tillman. The Manifesto
lambasted the Bourbon regime and called for a special farmers’ convention in March to
“suggest” candidates to the regular Democratic Party convention.51 Although the
subsequent March convention was undertaken with dubious validity, the result was that
Tillman be suggested as the Democratic candidate for governor, and in a one-party state
the Party’s nomination was essentially a sure victory. Tillman arranged for a series of
county stump debates in which he vilified the Conservatives; his influence and support
were so great that the once widely venerated Wade Hampton was shouted down from the
stage at a meeting in Aiken. The extent of Tillman’s actual radicalism is irrelevant; the
fact is that he symbolized a second “redemption” by the white masses within the
Democratic Party. Tillman’s enemies even unintentionally assisted in his symbolic
leadership of revolt by reacting so pointedly to his verbal abuse. Conservative leaders
and newspaper editors criticized not only Tillman, but the lower class farmers whom he
represented as well. By “describing Tillman’s putative constituency in insulting and
belittling terms, these leaders seemed to be precisely the callous aristocrats Tillman had
charged them with being.”52

Tillman went on to win two terms as governor before

being elected to the United States Senate, where he remained until his death in 1918.
Therefore Tillman, an uncouth rabble-rouser who effectively toppled the Conservative
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faction of the state, symbolized a triumph of the oppressed farmer that precluded a need
for the third-party bolt that occurred in other states.
It has been suggested that Tillman’s Reform movement was heavy on rhetoric and
light on tangible results. Historians insist that the measures he took while in the
governor’s office were essentially mild and not threatening to the conservative wing of
the state. This may seem to be the case. Nevertheless, by understanding the symbolic
value of Tillman’s efforts it becomes clear that he was giving would-be Populists enough
reform to deter them from a party bolt. Actually, one of Tillman’s most significant and
lasting contributions to agriculture in the state came before he was even elected—this
was Clemson Agricultural College. The symbolic importance of Clemson College is
evident in the serious protestations it caused among the Conservative faction, who
perceived it as a threat to the hallowed South Carolina College. Conservatives made
several attempts to forestall Clemson’s establishment, especially by supporting the claim
and lawsuit of Thomas Green Clemson’s granddaughter, who insisted that Fort Hill
rightfully belonged to her.53 After the Democratic Party Convention of 1890, a mob of
students from the South Carolina College followed Tillman to his hotel chanting: “We’ll
Hang Ben Tillman on a Sour Apple Tree,” and “Pass Around Tillman and We’ll all Take
a Kick.”54 Clearly the Conservatives despised Tillman for trying to tear down timehonored establishments. Ironically, their indignation only served to reinforce the beliefs
of thousands of poor white farmers that he was their flag-bearer.
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Along with tangible reform measures in state institutions and business, the
symbolic figure of Ben Tillman as a tribune of the plebian class was the most important
factor in the dearth of Populist activity in South Carolina. One of the crucial elements of
his career that allowed him to maintain that status was his endorsement of Farmers’
Alliance platforms. Tillman resented the Alliance’s position in South Carolina,
suspecting that the group was fomenting a third-party bolt. Nevertheless, he realized the
Alliance carried too much weight to have as a political enemy. Tillman was particularly
antagonistic to the sub-treasury plan; but after being bested in a debate with Alliance
leader Ben Terrell of Texas in the summer of 1891, Tillman decided to endorse the subtreasury plan, going as far as adopting it into the Democratic party platform for the 1892
elections.55 Tillman vocally endorsed almost every demand made by the Alliance and the
Populists themselves, although this was usually for political expediency. It has been
justly noted by several historians that a significant chunk of the state Alliance did not
endorse Tillman, yet the organization unequivocally approved of his most symbolic and
tangible accomplishment. At the fourth annual state Alliance meeting, president J.
William Stokes proclaimed that Clemson College was “one of the most desirable advance
movements in the history of the state. Its opening marks an epoch in the progress of the
institution, itself the noblest palsible [sic] monument to the intelligence, benevolence and
patriotism of its projectors.”56 While he was not as radical as some of the more
socialistic Populists, he effectively co-opted every plank of their platform, rendering a
55
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third party unnecessary. In fact, when Senator Tillman first arrived in Washington, many
of his peers mistook him for a bona fide Populist. White solidarity was indeed a real
factor in the South Carolina’s politics, but class division among whites was also just as
real.
Tillman’s reform movement was large on rhetoric, but it was not only bluster and
dramatized belligerence. While Tillman held the Governor’s office he did enact tangible
measures to ameliorate the white farmers’ condition. Included in his list of achievements
were: the founding of Clemson and Winthrop (for women) colleges, tax reforms, the
establishment of a railroad commission capable of fixing rates, and accomplishment of
greater white democracy through the switch to a party primary system.57 Furthermore,
his battle against monopolies in the phosphate mining industry, the reform of the state
Lunatic Asylum, and the restructure of the Penitentiary proved his legitimacy as a
reformer. While the farmers’ plight was just as bad when Tillman left office as when he
entered, many of the problems were beyond his power to fix. Francis B. Simkins insists
that he should not be judged by modern standards. “[He] came before socialist practices.
Measured according to the standards of his day, he was the most successful governor
South Carolina has ever had.”58
Ben Tillman was admittedly an integral factor in the oppression of African
Americans in South Carolina that survived him for many decades. It was not, however,
Tillman’s appeal to white supremacy that kept a Populist movement from springing forth
in South Carolina. It was instead the combination of tangible reform, his rough
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appearance and identification with poor farmers, his violent tirades against Conservative
“dandies”, and his co-opting of Farmer’s Alliance and Populist Party platforms that
precluded a third-party bolt within the state. He argued and cast blame enough, and
realized enough concrete results, to convince a majority of white South Carolinians they
had a populist reformer right in the Democratic ranks. The Alliancemen and the
Populists were out for reform, and according to the Tillmanites, they had achieved just
that without the need for a party change. Populists in other states did court the AfricanAmerican vote, but only because the reform-minded of them were not able to usurp the
leadership of their own parties first.
Much has been written about the radical leaders of other Southern states, such as
notable Populists Tom Watson of Georgia and Leonidas Lafayette Polk of North
Carolina. Additionally, historians like Stephen Kantrowitz have suggested that Populism
was at its core a “biracial movement,” and that the Tillman movement was simply a
white-supremacist reaction to progress.59 Kantrowitz’s language proposes that Populists
were benevolent and enlightened, while non-Populists, especially in South Carolina, were
so consumed by racism that they deliberately avoided bettering their own situation
through a third-party movement because it would inevitably lead to racial equality.
Kantrowitz and others, however, have denied the importance of Ben Tillman as a symbol
of reform, overestimated the compassion of the Populists, and overstated the strategy of
the Farmers’ Alliance in the South.
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Tom Watson, the Georgia lawyer turned Populist demagogue, is often cited as a
Southern example of what South Carolina lacked, a politician willing to be radical
enough for real agricultural reform. Watson sought African American’s votes—although
later in his life he became violently racist.60 Nevertheless, historian Randolph Werner
suggests that Watson’s and other party-bolters might have had other motivations than
honest reform and biracial cooperation. Werner contends that “Watson’s call for men to
join the People’s Party may have been driven less by programmatic issues like rural
poverty, the dispossessed, tariffs, or the sub-treasury plan than it was by the sense of
betrayal that he and others felt towards opportunists . . . [who were] willing to
accommodate metropolitan interests in return for investments in their city.”61 Therefore,
according to Werner, Watson and other Georgia Populists had motives similar to the
Tillmanites, who were angered by the aforementioned problems, but were also rankled by
Conservative leadership that did nothing to help their plight. The primary difference was
that Watson was unable to oust the Bourbon regime from Democratic leadership in
Georgia. This theory contradicts the notion that South Carolina nurtured a unique and
more powerful brand of white supremacy than her neighbors.
It is also significant to note that the Alliance, the forerunner of Populism, was not
a crusade for racial equality. In fact, the Alliance understood the racial situation and
Democratic loyalty in the region, and did not initially urge a party bolt. John D. Hicks
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wrote that “there [in the South] third-party action was scarcely thought of; instead,
control of the Democratic Party by the Alliance was the goal.”62 The Populists
themselves did not always favor racial equality—they simply needed black voters for any
chance at victory. In 1896 the People’s Weekly Tribune, a Populist organ in
Birmingham, Alabama, boasted that “no Negro was ever promised any political position
by the Populists,” and that “no Negro ever held a seat in any Populist Convention in
Alabama.”63 Again, it is clear that Populism did exist even where white supremacy was
the norm.
Well before Ben Tillman began his assault on the Bourbon regime at
Bennettsville, there was already a strong desire in the South to keep any reforms within
the family. In 1883 the Alliance organ in North Carolina insisted that “if the farmers of
the U.S. had voted continuously with the Democratic Party since the war,” the farmers
would not be suffering from trusts, money shortages, etc.64 Democratic solidarity was the
standard in the South, not the exception. Despite what most historians have recently
agreed upon, Benjamin Tillman was indeed a revolutionary figure—even if only
symbolically. He pandered to the populace when those before him had “held themselves
aloof,” unwilling to deign to hear to needs of common men.65 To answer those who
criticize Tillman’s lack of tangible reform, and conclude that his success was therefore
due to political machinations, and not support of the populace, one need remember the
62

Hicks, 170.
Reprinted from People’s Weekly Tribune (Birmingham), June 4, 1896. Alabama Department
of Archives and History. Quoted in The Populist Mind, ed. Norman Pollack (New York: BobbsMerrill Co., 1967) 392-3.
64
Ashville Daily Citizen, September 21, 1883.
65
Orville Vernon Burton, Intro to Pitchfork Ben Tillman, by Simkins, xx.
63

28

farmers’ perception of government at the time. Homer Clevenger insists, “The nature of
the farming enterprise made farmers individualists and conservatives.”66 Farmers
followed Jefferson’s maxim that “The least government is the best government.”67
Tillman’s supporters, even those among the Alliance, may have roared at times for
government action, but they were still essentially against too much government in their
business.
Ben Tillman, scowling, shouting, and poking with his pitchfork, was the symbol
that white South Carolinians wanted, though they might have needed railroad restrictions,
free silver, and rain. For the mass of lower class whites, however, a symbolic champion
who cast effete dandies from office, and enacted some meaningful legislation in their
favor, was enough to satiate their anger towards a corrupt system. Take Tillman out of
the equation and the sum changes. If there had not been a Tillman to overtake the
Bourbon regime, as in most Southern states, or if no one had beaten the Populists to the
mark and co-opted their platform, South Carolina would likely have had the same
Populist movement as her neighbors. When A.C. Haskell and his supporters, the
“Straightout Democrats,” ran against Tillman in 1890, they openly sought African
American voters. Despite the specter of racial fusion and a party split, the Haskellites
won roughly ten thousand votes. As Francis B. Simkins suggests, this is proof of “the
avid disesteem in which Tillman was held in certain circles.”68 It is, however, also proof
that the idea of courting black voters was not unapproachable when candidates were
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backed into a corner. The farmers of the Tillman movement might just have bolted in the
same manner, had a wild and foul-mouthed agitator not toppled the old regime and
provided them with a friendly symbol at the head of their traditional party.
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TILLMAN AND THE CREATION OF CLEMSON COLLEGE

The initial foray of Benjamin Tillman into agricultural reform at Bennettsville in
1885 may have seemed unnecessarily strident to the genteel politicians of the
Conservative clique, but his unorthodox ideas and aggressive approach initiated what is
perhaps his most enduring legacy, the agricultural college now known as Clemson
University. Tillman raged against inept state institutions that failed to benefit South
Carolina’s downtrodden soil tillers. He was motivated by a genuine disgust of the
inefficient farming practices that were commonplace, and insisted on an institution of
practical and scientific instruction to improve agricultural techniques. Tillman and his
devotees resented the South Carolina College and the Military Institute known as The
Citadel, which they perceived as snobbish and incongruous with the real needs of the
state. Nevertheless, it was not merely spite that drove Tillman to push for agricultural
education. He genuinely believed a separate agricultural college was the best chance of
elevating the prosperity of the citizens of largely rural South Carolina, who were sinking
in a debilitating cycle of soil-exhausting cotton production. Despite formidable
opposition, but aided by the death of Thomas G. Clemson and his subsequent will, the
Tillman faction achieved the goal of a separate agricultural college before he was elected
governor in 1890. By playing such a significant role in the founding of Clemson College,
Tillman proved he was not simply a political boss or demagogue, but was the most
progressive statesman that post-Reconstruction South Carolina could have realistically
produced.
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About 1881 Ben Tillman began to realize the necessity for agricultural education
when a series of droughts, insect infestations, and constantly fluctuating cotton prices
caused him, for the first time in his farming career, to lose money. He concluded that
Northern despotism and inequitable tariffs were not alone culpable for the southern
farmers’ plight, but that his and his compatriots’ fundamental approach to farming was
altogether wrongheaded. Tillman began to recognize that “the lack of rotation and the
constant plowing of the soil leaving it bare to the winter rains, could only result in final
and complete impoverishment . . . with resulting pauperism to the land owner.”1 He
decided that he was “woefully ignorant” of the necessary knowledge for successful
farming, and that the “agricultural masses” of South Carolina were in dire need of
industrial training to improve their sorry financial conditions.2
While Tillman found many faults with the conservative, aristocratic leaders of the
state, it was not class-based enmity or sectionalism that drove him to the public forum.
Rather, it was Tillman’s sincere determination to remedy the farmers’ predicament, and
he was thoroughly convinced that agricultural education was the most indispensable
ingredient in rectifying the situation in South Carolina. Subsequently, the debate over an
agricultural institution separate from the South Carolina College became the state’s
primary political issue from 1886 to 1889.3
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Although the predominant industry of South Carolina had always been
agriculture, until Tillman’s “farmers’ movement” in the mid-1880’s there had been few
efforts at educating farmers or providing practical training. However, there had been
some attempts by planters to organize and improve farming methods. In August 1785
coastal planters established the South Carolina Society for Promoting and Improving
Agriculture and Other Rural Concerns. This organization eventually developed into the
Agricultural Society of South Carolina, which Tillman insisted was dominated by
professional men and existed only to supply offices to wealthy politicians.4 The state’s
primary institution of higher education, South Carolina College, which had opened in
1804, provided students with a literary and classical curriculum.
Those whom Tillman perceived as wealthy aristocrats revered the college as near
sacred. However, during Reconstruction and Republican rule, state lawmakers in the
1868 South Carolina constitution mandated that “all the public schools, colleges, and
universities of this State, supported in the whole or part by the public funds, shall be free
and open to all the children of this State, without regard to the race or color.”5 The
specter of “negro domination” loomed over the school, which in 1869 Republicans
reorganized as a university, and the board of trustees admitted two African-American
members, F. L. Cardozo and B. A. Bozeman. Subsequently, many white students left for
other institutions, including South Carolina’s several denominational colleges, as well as
universities outside of the state. Furthermore, the school’s faculty began to resign at an
4
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alarming rate. On October 7, 1873, Henry E. Hayne, a black man who was also the
current secretary of state, enrolled in the medical school, prompting the single remaining
professor from the ante-bellum faculty, Maximilian LaBorde, to resign.6
After Democrats regained control of state in 1877, they closed the college until
1880, when enough funds could be appropriated to reopen the school with loyal party
members in control. Significantly, when the school reopened in 1880, it did so under the
new name of the South Carolina College of Agriculture and Mechanics. Nevertheless,
the so-called agricultural college lasted only two years—with no graduates—until it was
reestablished as the South Carolina College, with an emphasis again on classical
education. Furthermore, historian Daniel Walker Hollis insists that even in the years of
1880-1882, “it does not appear that the chief interest of the faculty and students was in
the field of agriculture or mechanics.”7
When Tillman began his assaults on the old guard, he did not initially demand a
separate agricultural school. His proposals at Bennettsville in August 1885 were almost
entirely focused on improving the state’s means of educating its farmers. At the joint
meeting of the South Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical Society and the state Grange,
after angrily castigating the haughty and corrupt officials in the current government,
Tillman offered four proposals to benefit South Carolina farmers. First, he insisted on an
experimental farm where modern techniques could be tested, and the resulting
6
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information disseminated for practical use. Tillman also suggested that the South
Carolina College—which he contended provided sufficient liberal education and training
for lawyers, but was of no practical value to the agricultural classes—be converted into
“a real agricultural institution.”8 He declared that the agricultural department of the
South Carolina College was a mere “sop to Cerberus, a bribe to maintain support of
farmers in the legislature,” and accused the college’s trustees of misappropriating federal
land-grant funds to finance “literary education.”9 The two final resolutions dealt with
restructuring the Board of Agriculture, which Tillman found to be a worthless distributor
of weather and crop reports, and establishing farmers’ institutes. Tillman urged the
restructure of the Board of Agriculture to include one farmer per congressional district,
and he suggested that only actual farmers should direct a farmers’ institute.10 The
convention accepted only one of Tillman’s resolutions, the creation of an experimental
station, and tabled the rest. Many present were openly shocked and offended by
Tillman’s criticisms of the Conservative leadership, and the Edgefield farmer went home
in a bitter temper.11
Although Tillman’s Bennettsville speech had offended Conservative leaders,
lower-class farmers rallied to his words and he gained a following that spread across the
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state. Furthermore, Tillman continued his attacks on Conservatives in a lengthy series of
letters to the Charleston News and Courier. He also changed a key component of his
initial resolutions in that he no longer called for a restructuring of the South Carolina
College, but proposed instead an entirely separate college devoted to agricultural and
mechanical studies. He asserted that there was not enough arable land around Columbia
to sustain an efficient agricultural college, and therefore the “corpse of agricultural
education” should be exhumed from Columbia and replanted in “some healthy upcountry county” where it might prosper.12 In 1886 Tillman and his Farmers’
Association—a statewide organization of farmers who sought political and governmental
redress of their grievances—took up the issue of a separate agricultural college with
fervor.
To some it seemed the issue was just a political ploy by the Tillman faction to
oust Conservatives from office and destroy the South Carolina College. While pressing
the college issue Tillman in fact vigorously denounced as corrupt the state leaders.
Furthermore, he accused the South Carolina College’s administration of
unscrupulousness and prophesized its possible downfall. One of the biggest problems
Tillman had with the Columbia school was that it offered agricultural education through
an “annex” as a way of procuring the federal funds provided through the Morrill Land
Grant Act. The fiery agitator denounced the college, saying that “it is agricultural and
mechanical when money is to be received; it is classical and literary when money is to be
spent.” Additionally, Tillman insisted college trustees relinquish their claims to the land-
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grant money “before the storm, which is brewing, shakes the foundations of their beloved
College, and perhaps, topples it to the ground.”13
Tillman’s barrages against the South Carolina College won him much support
among the poorer classes of whites, but also alienated potential supporters among the
state’s leadership. Several Conservative leaders, including the former governor Johnson
Hagood, expressed a genuine desire for a separate agricultural college. Nevertheless, they
refused to support the idea in light of Tillman’s harsh attacks on Conservatives. Hagood
declared that while he felt that “collegiate teaching of scientific and practical agriculture .
. . [would] best be done in a separate school,” while the farmers’ movement maintained
the direction it had chosen of attacking venerable state personalities and institutions, he
felt forbidden from “joining hands with it.”14
It is crucial to stress that Tillman’s interest in agricultural education was more
than a tool for political gains. Tillman studied the progress of other schools, including
the Michigan Agricultural College in Lansing, and the Agricultural and Mechanical
College of Mississippi in Starkville. After researching these and other agricultural
colleges he became firmly convinced that a separate college was necessary, and not an
agricultural addition to an existing institution. Tillman wrote that he found the
agricultural colleges in Michigan and Mississippi to be “so far in advance of any of the
13
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other hybrid institutions, that [he] appealed with all the power [he] possessed for the
founding of a similar institution in South Carolina.”15 His belief in the necessity of a
separate school for agricultural studies was only strengthened by a series of
correspondence with General Stephen D. Lee, president of the agricultural college in
Mississippi. Tillman sent Lee a copy of his speech at Bennettsville, and Lee’s response
stressed the importance of a separate institution with administrators and instructors who
understood the farmer’s life. According to Lee, the problem with “hybrid” colleges was
rooted in the “literary professors who have been put in charge of agricultural colleges—
men not in sympathy with agriculture or the industrial classes in any way, men who have
always made their living with their brains and having no belief in any other than a literary
training, or sympathy with labor—hence their general failure.”16 It is clear that Tillman
did not begin the push for a separate agricultural college out of mere spite for the state’s
Conservative leaders. Rather, he personally investigated the varying degrees of success
of other schools, and came to a reasoned conclusion that a separate agricultural college
was in the best interest of South Carolina farmers.
Tillman did win the approval of many South Carolina farmers by championing the
agricultural college. In his own words, “many hundreds of men from all over the State
whom I had never seen” sent him letters of endorsement for his ideas.17 Nevertheless, an
ironic twist within the movement he had initiated almost thwarted the creation of an
agricultural college. In April 1886 Tillman’s harangues against the state’s leaders led to
15
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a farmers’ convention in Columbia, where he was elected Chairman of the Executive
Committee. Farmers from throughout the state voted to create an annual convention in
November known as the Farmers’ Association that would stress their demands to the
state government.18 The Farmers’ Association would be maintained in local county
chapters. The overwhelming majority of delegates to the 1886 convention agreed on
most issues, especially the establishment of a separate agricultural college that would be
controlled by a reorganized Board of Agriculture and funded by the doubling of the
privilege tax on fertilizers.19
Tillman insisted that each local Farmers’ Association espouse as its first plank
“the establishment of a real agricultural college, separate and distinct from the South
Carolina College.”20 However, another significant goal of many farmers was
retrenchment in the state government. During deliberation before the 1886 legislative
elections, several county organizations stressed the importance of economic government
over that of the agricultural college. Conventions in Laurens and Greenville counties,
which were both hotbeds of the Tillman movement on most issues, emphasized
retrenchment and ignored the college issue altogether. Surprisingly, the Farmers’
Association convention in Spartanburg repudiated the separate college idea outright.21
Despite the lack of unity on the agricultural college, the majority of farmers still
supported the plan, and Tillman continued to push the idea vigorously. On October 31,
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1887, he spoke in Barnwell, home of his political enemy, Senator Lawrence W.
Youmans. To the well-oiled and supportive crowd Tillman thundered that ignorance was
the blame for their plight, and he further advocated an agricultural college, nominating
himself as trustee.22
The near demise of the separate agricultural college came about from a
combination of legislative maneuvers designed by Conservative politicians to prohibit the
funding of the proposed school. In December 1886 the senate defeated the Farmers’
Association’s proposal to reorganize the Agricultural Bureau with members elected by
the farmers’ convention rather than the legislature. However, they feared what reaction a
complete defeat of farmers’ demands might bring. Conservative representatives
proposed submitting the idea of an experimental station for conducting research that
would benefit the agrarian community. However, they included an amendment that
created two stations—one in Spartanburg and one in Darlington—so that neither one
would become large enough to eventually grow into a college without threatening the
other.23 The Farmers’ Association had urged the experimental station by insisting that
the Hatch Bill, which would soon pass in the U.S. Congress, would provide sufficient
funding for the station. The Hatch Act of 1887 supplied each state with $15,000 annually
to support an agricultural experiment station. Nevertheless, by splitting funds and
creating two stations, South Carolina Conservatives were not bending to the will of the
farmers, but instead ensuring that no significant reform was manifested.24
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The defeat of the Farmer’s Association’s demands to reorganize the Agricultural
Bureau had other ramifications for the Tillman movement than that of simply sustaining a
Conservative-operated body. It also killed almost any hope of funding a separate
agricultural college. The Farmers’ Association proposed to fund the Agricultural
Bureau—which would in turn operate the agricultural college—with the Morrill landgrant funds, the Hatch money, and the license tax on fertilizer sales. By defeating the
proposal, Conservatives ensured that the current system would remain, whereby the
South Carolina College’s agricultural school received the Morrill funds, the experimental
stations collected the Hatch appropriations, and the Agricultural Bureau operated on the
fertilizer tax.25 Furthermore, the only remaining option for financing a separate
agricultural college would be through increased taxation, which was anathema to cashstarved farmers. Consequently, in 1887 a bill proposing the separate college received
only four affirmative votes. Senator W.J. Talbert, a prominent Tillman backer from
Edgefield, explained that he had voted against the college proposal because the people
had not approved new expenditures.26
What seemed to be the coup de grace for Tillman’s college, and possibly his
public career, was the transformation of the South Carolina College into the University of
South Carolina. In the latter months of 1887, John M. McBryde, president of South
Carolina College, arranged a plan together with the college’s trustees to seize the
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momentum building among Tillman supporters for an agricultural institution.27 McBryde
argued the opposite side of Tillman’s justification. He insisted that agricultural and
mechanical training could be better taught in conjunction with a liberal arts curriculum,
rather than in a separate institution. McBryde cited the examples of Cornell University
and the University of California as proof that his proposed version of education would be
successful. He proffered a plan to convert the South Carolina College into the University
of South Carolina, which would include a bolstered agricultural school and subsequently
acquire both the Morrill and Hatch funds that Tillman wanted for his school.28
The Board of Trustees in Columbia approved the McBryde scheme, and began to
rally Conservative leaders and the public to their cause. Former Confederate General and
U.S. Representative John Bratton issued a public letter in the Charleston News and
Courier declaring his support of the transformation of the South Carolina College, which
he insisted would provide a “centralized unified system” of education.29 Governor J. P.
Richardson endorsed the University plan to the legislature, contending that it would serve
to remedy the problems caused by the agricultural college issue that was dividing the
Democratic Party. Despite the efforts of Tillman’s followers, lawmakers passed the
University bill before the end of 1887. The new University of South Carolina contained
colleges of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, Pharmacy, Law, Normal Education, and
27
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Liberal Arts and Sciences. For all but the most ardent devotees to Tillman’s separate
college, the Conservative’s announcements that the newly reorganized school would cost
approximately $100,000 less than a separate school convinced the public that the plan
made sense.30
The creation of the University nearly spelled the end of Tillman’s political career.
In January 1888, announcing his retirement to farming life near Edgefield, Tillman
delivered his farewell letter in the Charleston News and Courier, insisting that he could
not “afford the costly luxury of ‘reform’ any longer.”31 Tillman’s apparent withdrawal
from politics precipitated mixed responses across South Carolina, many of which were
reprinted from small newspapers in the News and Courier. The Aiken Recorder seemed
to delight in the agitator’s retirement, writing, “It is the valedictory of a disappointed
politician, who failed, utterly failed, in his grotesque masquerade as the champion of
farmers’ rights because he deserved to fail.” However, this did not indicate popular
sentiment. The Newberry Observer commended Tillman on his genuine and unselfish
motives behind the pursuit of a farmers’ college, and the Timmonsville Farmers’ Friend
exhorted its readers to “all unite . . . in urging Capt. Tillman to resume the field as leader
of the farmers’ movement.”32
During his relatively brief absence from public life, many farmers’ clubs and
county chapters of the Farmers’ Association continued to castigate the Conservatives
30
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who had quashed the dream of an agricultural college.33 Although this sentiment was a
factor in Tillman’s eventual return to the reform movement, it was ironically the death of
one of South Carolina’s leading advocates of the separate agricultural college that
propelled Tillman back into the fight with renewed zeal. On April 2, 1888, Thomas
Green Clemson died, leaving his Fort Hill property of 814 acres in Oconee County, along
with roughly $80,000, to the state for the establishment of a separate agricultural college.
Clemson, the son-in-law of John C. Calhoun, who originally hailed from Pennsylvania,
had spent time in Belgium studying agricultural techniques, and also in 1859 played a
role in the founding of Maryland Agricultural College. Furthermore, Clemson briefly
served as the Superintendent of Agricultural Affairs of the United States until 1861 when
he enlisted in the Confederate Army.34
In 1886, shortly after Tillman had taken up the farmers’ cause of an agricultural
college, Clemson had invited the Edgefield rabble-rouser, along with Daniel. K. Norris
and Richard W. Simpson, both prominent upstate proponents of a separate agricultural
college, to Fort Hill in order to discuss changes to Clemson’s will and the ultimate fate of
his estate. According to Tillman, during his overnight visit to Fort Hill, Clemson showed
the guests his will. It had originally been intended to establish Fort Hill as a sort of
Mount Vernon, a place of pilgrimage for the many admirers of the venerable John C.
Calhoun. Although his ideas were not “clear or well defined” Clemson favored
33
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establishing an agricultural and technical institution of education. Tillman assured the
elderly Clemson that the state would accept the donation of his property and begin work
on an agricultural college during his lifetime. However, Tillman later wrote that
Clemson was “the most suspicious man in regard to lawyers and the dangers of getting
involved with lawsuits [he had] ever met, and nothing [they] could say made any
impression upon him to take immediate action.”35
Just how reliable Tillman’s account is of the 1886 meeting is debatable, because
Clemson’s 1883 will had called for the establishment of a scientific institution—this
would have hardly resembled a Mount Vernon for Calhoun.36 Nevertheless, Clemson did
reshape his will to create an institute “to be modeled after the Agricultural College of
Mississippi as far as practicable.”37 This stipulation of Clemson’s will proves that he and
Tillman were thinking along the same lines, because Tillman was in correspondence with
Stephen D. Lee, president of the Mississippi college. Finally, Tillman, along with
Simpson and Norris, convinced Clemson to provide in his will a Board of Trustees, seven
of which would be life trustees who would be chosen by Clemson and would
subsequently choose their own successors, so that the state could not control the college.
Tillman and his peers feared that if the legislature had control of the school it might
eventually be turned into a literary institution, or even opened to black students.38
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The death of Thomas Green Clemson brought the issue of a separate agricultural
college, as well as Tillman’s political career, back to life in full force. Tillman called a
meeting of the executive committee of the Farmers’ Association, and they consulted on
April 20 at the Central Hotel in Columbia.39 Subsequently, in an “Address to the Farmers
of the State,” published in leading newspapers on April 26, the committee decided to
beseech the public and the state to accept “the munificent bequest of Mr. Clemson.”40
Significantly, they now had the perfect counterpoint to those who had argued that the
agricultural college would necessitate a tax increase. In addition to the money and land
donated by Clemson, the Tillman faction noted that the license tax on fertilizer, as well as
the federal grant monies, still rightfully belonged to the farmers, and not the University of
South Carolina. The Farmers’ Association also implored its agrarian supporters to
choose legislators in the 1888 elections who backed the college proposal, and to
denounce any candidate who was unwilling to openly endorse the acceptance of
Clemson’s will.41 The Edgefield Chronicle typified much public sentiment by writing
that before Clemson’s death the lack of funds for supporting a separate agricultural
college was a justifiable reason for avoiding such a plan. However, the generous gift to
the state invalidated the previous reasoning, and should be employed for the purpose he
stipulated.42 In the News and Courier the Greenville County Farmers’ Association issued
a public “call [to] all who sympathize with the farmers of the State . . . to join with us in
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making the establishment of an agricultural college, without increasing taxation, the issue
in the coming Democratic primaries.43
The Clemson bequest had put the agricultural college issue on the political
forefront again, with farmer’s clubs vigorously writing newspapers in support and
Tillman stumping across the state. The Conservatives and agricultural college opponents,
however, were not willing to capitulate immediately. The University’s trustees led a
campaign to convince the citizens that the separate college idea was still unadvisable, and
attempted forestall any changes in the University’s structure.44 Some Conservatives
argued to accept the Clemson bequest, but to keep intact the agricultural school at the
University with the land-grant funds. This scheme would nullify the Tillman camp’s
chief bargaining chip, the fact that a separate college need not result in increased taxation.
Congressman Samuel Dibble argued that the farmers had every right to an agricultural
college, as long as those who wished to have their sons “taught agriculture in connection
with classical and literary branches, and in company with the youth of the State at the
State University, shall not be deprived of the privilege.”45
The University also fought the Clemson proposal by reaching out to the state’s
farmers to show how the agricultural school in Columbia was already working for their
benefit. University professors held farmers’ institutes in Barnwell, Florence, Fairfield,
Laurens, Orangeburg, and Spartanburg. The institutes featured lectures on scientific
advancements in agriculture, along with musical entertainment and refreshments.
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Following each speaker, the institute organizers circulated boxes for farmers to submit
questions to the experts. According to newspaper accounts, the institutes drew large
crowds and were generally regarded as a success.46 Additionally Conservatives and
University trustees argued that certain provisions of Clemson’s will made it imprudent
for the state to accept. They insisted that stipulation of a board consisting of seven life
trustees with the power to select their successor, and only six state-elected trustees,
rendered the state too little power in controlling the school. During a July speech in
Greenville, Governor Richardson declared that “South Carolina . . . is no longer a pauper
and need stand at no door in need of clothing, bodily or intellectually, but what she
adopts should be under her control and used for her people and them only.”47 What
Richardson failed to account for was that many South Carolina farmers—as the result of
agricultural depression, crop liens, and mortgage foreclosures—were indeed paupers or at
least close to it. Furthermore, Ben Tillman and the Farmers’ Association had been
drumming into their heads for three years the belief that their sorry condition could be
improved with an agricultural college that was not shackled to an institution mired in
aristocratic conservatism. According to Tillman supporter J. E. Tindall from Clarendon,
“the farmers’ movement had put into the mouths of all the politicians the song of
education,” and before the Democratic primaries the college issue had been “discussed on
ten thousand stumps.”48

46

Charleston News and Courier, July 12, 17, 19, 30, August 6, 1888; Lawton, “Farmers’
College,” 57.
47
Charleston News and Courier, July 25, 1888; Lawton, “Farmers’ College,” 60-61.
48
J. E. Tindall speech in the South Carolina House of Representatives, December 13, printed in
Charleston News and Courier, December 14, 1888; Lawton, “Farmers’ College,” 59.

48

The greatest effort Conservatives made against the Clemson bequest was actually
initiated by Gideon Lee, Clemson’s northern-born son-in-law. On May 21, 1888, Lee
issued a letter in the News and Courier arguing that Clemson had denied his daughter—
Clemson’s granddaughter and John C. Calhoun’s great-granddaughter—Floride Isabella
Lee, her rightful inheritance.49 The stipulations of Clemson’s will were straightforward
and legal, but Lee still invoked the memory of Calhoun, and called on South Carolinians’
“manliness, generosity, and chivalry” to rectify the wrongs done to his daughter.50 He
warned state legislatures that it would be undignified to join in a scheme that would rob
the granddaughter of one the state’s greatest heroes of her lawful property. In November
1888 Lee filed suit in Federal Court to protest the Clemson will. While Conservatives
such as John Haskell agreed with Lee that it would be inappropriate to involve the state in
litigation against Calhoun’s descendent, Senator E. B. Murray maintained that swift
action was unnecessary since the Clemson will gave the state three years to accept the
gift. Therefore, the legislature could postpone any decision until the case had been
decided.51
In 1888 the Farmers’ Association failed to nominate its preferred gubernatorial
candidate, Joseph Earle of Sumter. Nevertheless, a rowdy statewide campaign with
Tillman stumping in almost every county resulted in the nomination of a majority of
Democratic candidates who were pledged to support the farmers’ movement.52
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Subsequently, in late December the House managed to pass the Clemson College bill
with relative ease. However, in the Senate it took the tie-breaking vote of Lieutenant
Governor William L. Mauldin to ensure the bill’s final passage.53 Governor Richardson,
however, decided to postpone signing the measure until the following year, an action that
he was allowed by a peculiar constitutional provision authorizing the governor to
withhold signature on any bill that did not reach him more than three days before the
close of the legislative session.54
Richardson in actuality was not delaying the building of the college, since that
could not begin until Gideon Lee’s lawsuit was decided. Nevertheless, the governor took
serious heat from the state’s farmers during the delay. The Greenville News accused the
governor of straddling the political fence, while the Florence Farmer’s Friend
admonished him for being “the figurehead who sits in the gubernatorial chair and obeys
the bidding of the bosses.”55 Even after the United States Circuit Court ruled against Lee
in May 1889, Richardson balked at signing the bill. On May 24, even Francis W.
Dawson, the editor of the Charleston News and Courier who had split with the Tillman
faction when he publicly supported the earlier University of South Carolina bill, implored
the governor to acquiesce to popular demand in an editorial titled “Sign the Bill
Governor.”56 Richardson remained obstinate, but in November finally capitulated and
endorsed the measure. Soon after the legislature passed another Clemson bill that
53
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appropriated funds for the maintenance of the college. The measure donated $15,000 of
state funds to the college outright; additionally it allotted Clemson College $15,000
annually from the Agricultural Bureau’s income from the fertilizer-privilege tax.
Furthermore, the all-important Morrill land-grant funds would go to the new institution.
The legislature compensated the University of South Carolina with $4,000 in addition to
its usual appropriation.57
The initial appropriations to Clemson College proved to be relatively insignificant
compared to what would come in the next year. In 1890 Tillman won the governor’s
office and effected drastic transformations to the state’s agricultural and educational
institutions. Tillman and his devotees in the legislature eliminated the two experiment
stations in Darlington and Spartanburg, sold these properties, and turned over the revenue
to Clemson. Tillman abolished the Agricultural Bureau; consequently, he gave to
Clemson’s Board of Trustees the bureau’s annual income of $25,000 as well as the
profits from the sale of the “Agricultural Hall” in Columbia. Finally, in a stinging blow
to his Conservative enemies, the new governor eliminated the University of South
Carolina, which reverted back to the South Carolina College, a school dedicated to
“theoretical science, law, literature, and the classics.”58
Those who had dispelled Tillman’s backing of the agricultural college as simply a
political maneuver were mistaken. Although Tillman might not have been in agreement
with national agrarian organizations on every issue, one thing they did have in common
was an emphasis on the importance of education. Historian Alfred C. True claimed that
57
58

South Carolina, Acts, 1889, 299-302; Lawton, “Farmers’ College,” 74.
South Carolina, Acts, 1890, 687-691, 705-708; Lawton, “Farmers’ College,” 75.

51

the original motivations of the Patrons of Husbandry (the Grange) were completely
educational and social.59 Tillman had no love for socialistic programs that would reward
ineptitude or equally distribute wealth. His idea of reform was breaking any obstacles in
the way of the farmer’s prosperity—for example, unreasonable railroad rates or
unnecessarily high taxes—and providing quality, practical education that would allow
farmers to work their way to success. Therefore, if Tillman’s plan for agricultural
improvement seems less radical than those of the Farmers’ Alliance or Populists, then it
is because Tillman’s ideas were rooted in an independent sense of self-reliance, not
socialistic cooperation. Tillman’s “conservatism” was a belief that good education and
hard work were the keys to prosperity. Biographer Thornwell Haynes quoted Tillman as
saying that “success in life requires self-reliance and labor; that work is honorable, that
work is necessary . . . that knowledge of books is good, but not the only knowledge that is
necessary, that knowledge of things is better; and that skill, energy and perseverance,
with diversified pursuits, will alone make South Carolina great and prosperous.”60 On
July 7, 1893, at the opening session of Clemson College, Tillman told the crowd of over
1,500 that “we intend to introduce you to science, and let you set to work to place South
Carolina ahead in agriculture as she ought to be. Let me burn it into your hearts and
brain, your motto should be ‘Work’.”61
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Clemson College opened to students in 1893, and by 1905 over 3,000 young men
had matriculated at the school. Most were South Carolina natives, and a slim majority
studied engineering and mechanical arts, while the remainder focused on farming.62 The
agricultural college was both downplayed and criticized by Tillman critics who insisted it
would favor upcountry residents, and that there were too many farmers in the state to
benefit from a relatively small school. However, it is important to realize that Clemson
College continued to serve the functions previously performed by the experiment stations
and the Agricultural Bureau, one of the primary duties being that of fertilizer inspection.
Accordingly, officials from Washington annually ensured that the college was conducting
experiments on plant and animal diseases, working on remedies for such, analyzing soil
and water, experimenting with new methods of producing cheese and butter, and “other
researches or experiments bearing directly on the agricultural industry of the United
States.”63 The Clemson experiment stations also distributed thousands of pamphlets to
farmers with information on multifarious concerns and products, such as meteorology,
hog cholera, and the improvement of worn-out soils. In 1907 Clemson President P. M.
Mell proclaimed that the experiment stations were “teaching the farmer how to save his
crops; how to care for and use his machines; how to maintain the fertility of the soil; how
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to keep cash accounts, and know correctly the income and outgo of the energies of the
farm.”64
Clemson College also proved not to be only an upcountry bastion for a select few.
Through 1905 Charleston county supplied 197 of the college’s students, second only to
Anderson county.65 Furthermore, through the work of “train-based” farmers’ institutes,
the college disseminated relevant information to farmers across the entire state. The
Clemson Board of Trustees began the institute program, through no insistence from the
state government, to spread the experiment station’s findings to farmers who could use
the information. The Southern Railway provided two coaches and free travel to
Clemson, enabling the school to hold twenty-six farmers’ institutes in 1906 alone. Over
6,000 farmers attended the institutes, which reached virtually every corner of the state.
Additionally, in August 1906 Clemson College held a two-day institute on campus,
where over 1,000 farmers attended.66
Ben Tillman was not directly responsible for Thomas Green Clemson’s donation
to South Carolina; neither was he solely accountable for the state’s acceptance of the
bequest. Nevertheless, through his letters published in the Charleston News and Courier,
and his innumerable stump speeches across the state, Tillman, more than any other
individual, convinced the mass of South Carolina farmers that a separate agricultural
college was one of the first things they needed to ameliorate their impoverished
condition. The agricultural college idea became the state’s most heated political issue
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between 1885 and 1889. However, it is important that Tillman never ran for political
office during this time, nor did he stand to gain financially by the construction of
Clemson. Tillman seems genuinely to have been convinced that the college was crucial
to the farmers’ case. Obviously, Tillman did embark on a lengthy political career, and he
personally considered the establishment of Clemson College as one of his greatest
achievements.
It is also significant that Tillman continued to take a great personal interest in the
operation of the college until his death in 1918. He corresponded regularly with Walter
Merritt Riggs, president of Clemson from 1910 to 1924. In 1911 Tillman wrote to Riggs
that he had “dreamed [of a] College where the studies would be not only Latin and Greek
and the Classics, but such as would prepare a man to make his bread and butter.”67
Tillman also argued to Riggs his importance in the creation of the college over that of R.
W. Simpson, who was the executor of Thomas G. Clemson’s will and also a life trustee.
Tillman’s sons, Ben Jr. and Henry, both Clemson students, also had lengthy
correspondences with Riggs about the problems of nepotism and interference with daily
operations by trustees of the college—particularly by Simpson.68 Obviously, as proven
by the time and effort devoted by he and his family members, Clemson College was
genuinely important to Tillman, and not just a political tool.
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Another important factor in Tillman’s ultimate political power in South Carolina
is the fact that Tillman began his crusade for farmers two years before the Farmers’
Alliance—the vanguard of the Populist Party—entered the state. Consequently, even
though Tillman and many of his peers joined the organization, the majority of South
Carolina Alliance members and farmers already perceived Tillman as their champion.
Tillmanism and the Clemson College struggle had already served as an outlet for agrarian
political protest before the Alliance was able to establish a secure foothold in the state.
Therefore, the Alliance, although quite successful in South Carolina, did not acquire the
same devotion as it did in other Southern and Western states. Many farmers were
members of Tillman’s Farmers’ Association before they encountered the Alliance, and
the Edgefield reformer was able to keep the vast majority of them from jumping on the
populist bandwagon largely because of his early fight for the agricultural school.
Furthermore, several members of the original Clemson College Board of Trustees were
prominent State Alliance officials.69 With these state leaders overlapping membership in
the National Farmers’ Alliance, the South Carolina Farmers’ Association, and the
Clemson College Board of Trustees, it was not difficult for Tillman to steer agrarian
sentiment in his direction and away from third-party radicalism.
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Several historians have attempted to besmirch Tillman’s legacy by insisting that
he was not radical, neither socially nor politically. They maintain that he employed
dramatic and revolutionary rhetoric to illicit lower-class approval and secure his political
position, while actually remaining the conservative master of a calculating political
machine. Often cited as proof of his reactionary personality is Tillman’s disagreement
with the Farmers’ Alliance and Populists on critical issues like the sub-treasury plan, and
his adamant avowal of the superiority of the white race. Furthermore, since Tillman’s
white-supremacist views are not in question, historians have taken the syllogistic step to
concluding that appeals to white solidarity must have been the determinant in the relative
dearth of populist activity in South Carolina. However, Tillman’s attacks on
Conservative traditions and symbols, such as the South Carolina College, and his
promotion of a separate agricultural college that would benefit the state’s farmers through
the improving of modern, scientific techniques, were “progressive” in intent and the
actual reasons that he was able to keep the support of Democratic farmers and forestall a
third-party bolt.
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TILLMAN’S REFORMS OF STATE INSTITUTIONS

Ben Tillman’s reform agenda, despite its ostensible emphasis on agrarian issues,
did extend beyond the plight of the farmers. Although he nurtured a sincere love for
farming and worked to alleviate unnecessary financial burdens and better educate the
people who practiced agriculture, Tillman also spent a great deal of energy reforming
state institutions from both financial and humanitarian perspectives. Although he has
deservedly been censured for his efforts to discourage African-American socio-political
equality, Tillman made several attempts, albeit with varying degrees of success, to
improve the condition of multiple matters of state, and these were issues that were
germane to progressive-minded politicians across the country. Tillman revamped both
the state’s Lunatic Asylum and the Penitentiary, improving not only the institution’s
fiscal efficiency, but also the living conditions and the overall treatment of patients and
inmates. Finally, although extremely controversial, Tillman’s establishment of a stateowned dispensary for liquor sales was a realistic attempt to forge a compromise between
the degradations of widespread saloons and proliferation of unregulated bootleg whiskey,
and the outright prohibition of alcohol. Tillman’s reforms in these instances might be
interpreted as retrenchment, political machinations, or despotism; however, in each case
the governor actually attempted to remedy preexisting problems and economize the state
government with the ultimate objective of lightening the tax burden for the agricultural
class.
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When Tillman took the governor’s office one of his first missions involved an
investigation of allegations of corruption at the Lunatic Asylum and a review of
Superintendent Peter E. Griffin, who had been appointed by Tillman’s conservative
predecessors. The original South Carolina Lunatic Asylum had been erected between
1822 and 1827 in Columbia.1 The two men generally credited with the foundation of the
Asylum are Samuel Farrow and William Crafts. Farrow, a Revolutionary War veteran
from Spartanburg, served as South Carolina Lieutenant Governor from 1810 to 1812,
then as a U. S. Congressman until 1815 when he returned home to enter the state House
of Representatives, where he began his promotion of a state mental institution. William
Crafts was a younger Harvard College-educated Charlestonian who worked for reform in
the areas of increased rights for Roman Catholics and Jews, creation of the Medical
College of South Carolina, and better education for the deaf and dumb. Historian Peter
McCandless, the only scholar to have written a substantial account of the Asylum, argues
that the creation of the institution was due to a larger movement than just Farrow and
Williams. Despite the two reformers’ importance in the issue, McCandless insists that
“asylum reform in South Carolina,” as in other states and Europe “was the work of an
elite but diverse coalition of physicians, educators, lawyers, legislators, and social
activists.” Moreover, McCandless stresses the importance of those who wanted to keep
their state up-to-date and respected among contemporary modern thinkers. “The
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[Asylum] was as much an expression of civic pride as of humanitarian, medical, or
social-control arguments.”2
During the later part of the nineteenth century the South Carolina Lunatic Asylum
experienced a dramatic rise in population, increasing from about 300 patients in 1877 to
approximately 1100 in 1901. Furthermore, the office of superintendent had become a
post of political importance, as the job was generally given to a physician who backed the
reigning regime.3

Before Tillman took office, his predecessor Governor J. P.

Richardson had attempted to invalidate allegations of managerial corruption on the part
of the Lunatic Asylum’s superintendent Peter Griffin, and of the inhumane treatment of
the asylum’s patients. In 1877 the legislature appointed Griffin, a South Carolina native
and Confederate veteran who received an M.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, to
the post of superintendent of the Asylum.4 In his departing address to the General
Assembly, the final steward of the “Conservative Regime” made a thoroughly
unconvincing effort at justifying the problems of the asylum. First Richardson noted a
significant increase in the asylum population—most especially among black residents—
over the previous decade. Between 1878 and 1889 the white population increased from
230 to 409, a growth of 75%, while the black population had increased from 101 to 313, a
spike of 200%. He also cited the Report of the Regents of the Lunatic Asylum that

2

Peter McCandless, Moonlight, Magnolias, and Madness: Insanity in South Carolina from the
Colonial Period to the Progressive Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996),
40-41. See also Barbara Bellows, “The Founding of the South Carolina Lunatic Asylum,” South
Carolina Historical Magazine, 82, (1981): 263-72.
3
McCandless, Moonlight, Magnolias, and Madness, 235; House Journal, 1881, 29. By 1880 the
Lunatic Asylum absorbed almost one-third of the state’s appropriations.
4
McCandless, Moonlight, Magnolias, and Madness, 236.

60

revealed for the fiscal year of 1889-90, the total population of the institution had risen
from 722 to 778, an increase of 56 patients within a single year. According to
Richardson, any allegations of patient neglect could therefore be attributed to
overpopulation, which was beyond the government’s control. Another serious problem
was the question of where or how to house the growing number of black patients. Up
until that time black patients were accommodated in separate wards from whites, yet
within the same building. Richardson insisted that though the government had been
trying for five or more years to decide the fate of “this class of patients,” it could not
determine whether the blacks should be lodged in an annex to the main Asylum, or in a
separate institution altogether.5 Over five years of indecision and inaction concerning an
obvious problem in need of attention was exactly the type of government stagnation that
Tillmanite reformers despised.
Richardson concluded his address on the Asylum issue with self-congratulatory
plaudits for the frugal manner in which the asylum had recently been operated. He
showed that the state’s cost per patient had decreased from $202.83 in 1876 to just
$131.05 thirteen years later. The 1889 cost per patient was the lowest in the asylum’s
history. Richardson marveled at the fact that for only thirty-seven cents a day, each
patient was provided with “food, lodging, clothing, light, fuel, washing, medicine, and
medical attention.” Furthermore, this was especially miraculous because in this case the
state was dealing with “repairing and refurnishing in a population [that was] peculiarly
destructive.” The meager funds allotted for the patients were thus proof that “there can
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be no possible ground for the charge of extravagant management.”6 Richardson,
however, did not address the seemingly unmistakable problem posed by a combination of
a large population increase, an ignored need of additional living space, and the sharp
decrease in government funding. Richardson may have been trying to disprove fiscal
malfeasance, but he inadvertently made a strong case that the Asylum’s living conditions,
and its entire system of operations, were unacceptable to the progressive-minded
community.
In his inaugural address Governor Tillman acknowledged the dilemma facing the
Asylum and the state. After visiting the Asylum just once, he had concluded that the
institution was overcrowded and also that many of the patients need not be there. He also
disputed Governor Richardson’s claims that the cost per patient was thirty-seven cents
per day. Tillman insisted “a glance at the accommodation, clothing, etc. of the colored
patients shows that they do not cost anything like this amount; and therefore the white
patients are costing much more per capita than is shown in the report.”7 In Tillman’s
estimation, Asylum directors had inadequately provided for the black patients in order to
report a more favorable expenditure to the legislature and the public. Tillman did not
directly call for retrenchment or cutting the allotted funds for the Asylum, which he
contended “[was] about one-fifth of [the] entire State expenditure.” Instead, he
envisioned a different strategy for caring for the state’s “unfortunates,” which he
maintained society must do “for the sake of humanity.” Tillman concluded that two
points were certain: “(1) There are people in the Asylum who ought not to be there
6
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because they can be more economically supported elsewhere; and (2) A change should be
made in the law so as to require each county to support its own insane.”8 The new
governor’s plan would ease the overcrowded Asylum’s problems by shifting needy but
harmless individuals to county homes or poorhouses that already existed, and
simultaneously decrease one of the state’s most burdensome expenses. Under Tillman’s
plan, the state could therefore provide more than adequate care for the patients of the
state Asylum, without the need for increased appropriations or higher taxes.
Tillman also discredited the state’s current system of caring for the insane on two
other points. First, he insisted that many patients who were capable of paying for their
care were actually living off the state’s dime because their families had taken advantage
of the patient’s property. The law read: “lunatics who have property shall be supported
from the income therefrom.”9 Tillman insisted, however, that he knew of cases where
family members had taken the property of patients, while “the County Commissioners
whose duty it is to enforce [the law] . . . have winked at the wrong to please some friend,
and curry favor with an influential voter.”10 The next problem with the system was its
procedure for assigning members to the Board of Regents who managed the Asylum. At
the time, all six regents were appointed simultaneously, held office for six years, and
were then replaced by a new group. Tillman complained that this was an inefficient
practice because there was no chance of “injecting new blood into these important
administrative positions” during their tenure, and also because there was too a great risk
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for dangerously “abrupt change” when replacing the entire board and not benefiting from
any of its experience.11
Despite his grievances with several aspects concerning the Asylum, during his
first year in office the only measure Tillman was able to pass through the legislature
addressed the structuring of the Board of Regents. In 1827 the legislature had passed a
bill extending the power to oversee operation of the Asylum and appoint employees to a
board of nine regents.12 On December 5, 1891, lawmakers endorsed a measure that
permitted the governor to reduce the board to five regents, and that those individuals
would subsequently draw lots whereby two would serve for two years, two would serve
for four years, and one for six years.13 When Tillman asked four of the regents to resign,
the entire board quit; Tillman considered this proof that they were unwilling to help the
state in needed reform. The measure that restructured the Board of Regents thus ensured
that it would continuously have both men with new ideas and those with experience.
Although this was the only tangible change to the asylum in his first year—he
attributed any failures for better reform to the “driftwood” legislature—Tillman had not
forgotten the other issues he had affirmed in his inaugural address, and he pushed harder
for more change in his second year in office. In April 1891 a committee appointed by the
legislature began investigating charges of corruption and patient neglect at the Asylum.
For an unspecified reason the committee, according to Tillman, adjourned without
completing its work. Nevertheless, it did interview several employees and found, among
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other “reprehensible irregularities,” that one inmate had been regularly permitted to carry
a pistol.14 The patient, referred to only as Milne, was also employed by the Asylum as
carpenter and painter, and allegedly had a key giving him access to the entire building.15
According to the committee’s initial findings, this enabling of violent inmates to mix
unrestrained with the other patients had resulted in injuries and at least one death.
Furthermore, a number of people questioned maintained that the superintendent made
few and irregular visits, and also that he had provided a male inmate with a key to the
female wards.16 When Tillman learned that the same patient who had been alleged to
carry a firearm made a homicidal attack on one of the attendants, the Governor recalled
the committee to address the problem. Committee members Dr. T. J. Strait, a senator
from Lancaster, and Dr. H. P. Goodwin, a representative from Greenville, joined Tillman
and a stenographer in conducting another series of interviews with both staff members
and patients at the asylum. The committee determined that there had been “very lax
discipline and negligence, attributable to the Superintendent, Dr. P. E. Griffin.”17
Tillman invited Griffin to defend the accusations against him. Griffin refused,
demanding instead that he be given a formal hearing before the Senate or the Board of
Regents. He did, however, ardently repudiate all the charges that had been levied against
him.18 On May 18, 1891 Tillman ordered Griffin to resign, after Griffin declined to
14
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defend himself to the governor in person. In July Tillman appointed Dr. J. W. Babcock
to succeed Griffin as superintendent of the Asylum. Tillman’s Conservative foes claimed
that it had been his intention all along to oust Griffin and replace him with a political
friend.19 While to some this may have appeared to be a legitimate complaint, it is
apparent by Babcock’s record both prior and subsequent to his appointment that he was a
highly skilled physician and genuinely concerned with running a modern and humane
institution. Originally from Chester, Babcock was the winner of the highly esteemed
Story Scholarship at Harvard and had had experience as assistant physician at
Massachusetts’s most acclaimed asylum, McLean Hospital. Nevertheless, Tillman’s
actions in this case brought out from his enemies the usual cries of despotism and
political bossism. Although Babcock himself had been in Massachusetts during the rise
of the Tillman movement, his family members in South Carolina were open Tillman
supporters.20 Columbia State Writer Narcisco G. Gonzales protested that the charges
against Griffin were never satisfactorily proven, and that the situation was simply another
Tillman ploy to gain absolute control over the state. James C. Hemphill of the Charleston
News and Courier echoed Gonzales’ sentiment, accusing Tillman of acting illegally in
Griffin’s dismissal. Tillmanites, however, supported the governor and insisted that the
dire situation at the asylum called for an immediate change in leadership.21
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In his second term Governor Tillman also initiated measures—which were passed
this time—to improve the efficiency and conditions of the Asylum. The legislature
approved a bill penalizing sheriffs that violated a new law whereby they could not
transport potential patients without the prior consent of the new superintendent.22
Furthermore the government approved funding of $100,000 for general upkeep, $1,000 to
improve the sanitary conditions of the bathrooms, and $150 for the asylum’s library.23
During his 1892 address to the General Assembly, Tillman applauded the work that
Superintendent Babcock and Steward and Treasurer J. W. Bunch had done in
economizing and improving the overall conditions of the Asylum. He did, however,
continue to urge the legislature to pass a bill that would send many of the harmless
residents to county poorhouses. This measure, which would have greatly reduced state
expenses, never materialized for Tillman. Nevertheless, Tillman had ousted a
superintendent who had been accused of corrupt practices before he was even elected
governor. He filled the post with a highly accredited physician who, by all accounts,
ended such disturbing conditions as murders by pistol-toting inmates.
Tillman never achieved his biggest goal of sending more patients to county
residences. Yet, he did introduce an improved system for appointing regents, supplied
funds for sanitary improvements, and still commended the new administration for its
work in creating a safer environment for the patients, as well as a more economical
institute for the state. After his second year in office Tillman was content with the
progressive changes he had helped to develop, despite not being able to shift expenses to
22
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the counties. This fact contradicts newspaper critics Gonzales and Hemphill who assured
their readers that Tillman only wanted supreme control over every state institution.
Moreover, the previously discussed events draw a different picture of Tillman than the
one painted by historian Stephen Kantrowitz, who is singularly interested in denouncing
Tillman’s entire career because of his views on racial equality. Kantrowitz never once
mentions Tillman’s reform of the Asylum in his lengthy political biography. Despite the
verbal assaults from his past and present critics, Governor Tillman’s dealings with the
Lunatic Asylum show him to be a relatively social progressive and economically minded
statesman, not a duplicitous political boss or power-hungry tyrant. Admittedly, Tillman’s
progressivism did not include the socio-political equality of African Americans or
women, but this does not negate his credentials as a reformer.
During his inaugural address Tillman asserted that next to the Lunatic Asylum the
state institution of the greatest “magnitude and importance” was the Penitentiary. South
Carolina had a long history of penal reform. In 1820 a Board of Public Works
investigation found that most county jails were in disrepair and overcrowded. Reformers
argued that the state’s criminal code was too harsh—in 1813 there were 165 offenses that
were punishable by death. Therefore, reformers cited the need for a state Penitentiary,
where criminals convicted of minor offenses could serve out long-term sentences in a
more humane environment than in county jails. After years of debate, the General
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Assembly approved the establishment of a state Penitentiary on the Congaree River in
1866.24
It was widely accepted in the nineteenth century that convicts should labor to
provide at least the expense of their incarceration, and thus lessen their burden to
taxpayers. State officials faced the dilemma of trying to control prisoners, make their
existence either profitable or at least self-sustaining, and ensure that prisoners were
treated humanely.25 The convict-lease system was designed to hire out prisoners—in the
South these convicts were predominantly African-American—to farmers or businessmen,
or to provide labor for state sponsored construction. According to historian Matthew J.
Mancini, “leasing . . .took the care and expense of thousands of prisoners out of the direct
purview of the state, it provided a large pool of extremely cheap labor . . . and it helped
attract northern capital with which business leaders in the post-bellum South were so
obsessed.”26 Although progressive reformers across the country, such as prison reform
crusader Enoch Cobb Wines27 emphasized the evils of convict leasing because of the
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cruel treatment received by the prisoners, Governor Tillman’s primary objective was
economizing the system and generating greater profits for the state. While this might
suggest that Tillman was uninterested in the humanitarian aspects of the issue, it is
significant that for penal reformers, South Carolina was not on the list of the most
infamous abusers of the convict-lease system.
In 1880 the New York Times decried Mississippi’s abuse of the convict lease
system, noting that the prisoners, who were mostly African Americans, were hired out in
gangs to farmers and railroads, where they were burdened by ball and chain and
constantly at the end of an overseer’s rifle. “They [the convicts] are treated like brutes,
poorly fed, overworked, and badly housed. It is said that the average length of a
convict’s life in one of these gangs, is only three years.”28 South Carolina was not
innocent of prison abuse, but reformers noticed a significant improvement of conditions,
especially in death rates of convict laborers in 1882. The New York Times wrote that
year, “it is but justice to that that the comparatively small average death rate since 1879 is
due chiefly to the efforts of prison superintendent, Mr. J. T. Lipscomb.”29 In 1883
reformers elucidated the huge distinction between the treatment of those prisoners
working outside the prison with private contractors and those under direct supervision of
Penitentiary employees. “Nineteen out of an average 320 leased hands died in 9 months,
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while only 5 out of 800 hands kept in the penitentiary died during that time.”30 The
Conservative superintendent Lipscomb had greatly ameliorated efficiency and humanity
among prison authorities, but private contractors still abused the convicts in alarming
fashion.
When Ben Tillman achieved the governor’s office, he promoted a plan that would
both increase the revenue from the Penitentiary, and also curb abuse to the prisoners.
Tillman maintained that the institution had been run inefficiently due to the fact that its
managers had been selected by the General Assembly on a political basis. He contended,
“offices requiring high order of business talent are given to men who can speak well or
who have rendered political services, while they are wholly lacking in administrative
ability.”31 Tillman also argued that convicts had for too long been only hired out for
agricultural work. Since the country was in an agricultural depression, and subsequently
farm work paid little, the state failed to benefit from the supply of labor it had to sell.
Tillman insisted that convicts ought to be hired out to the highest bidder, whether to
private businesses or public operations, no matter what the job. Furthermore, to prevent
the previously mentioned abuses that often accompanied convict leasing to private
concerns, Tillman suggested that the Penitentiary would continue to provide food,
clothing, and guarding for convicts in order to prevent their mistreatment. In fact, his
plan conformed exactly to the preferred system of reformer Enoch Cobb Wines. Wines
illustrated the distinction between the contract system and the convict-lease system, and
asserted that the former was much more humane. Under the contract system, which
30
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Tillman was proposing, only the labor of the prisoner was hired out, while the feeding,
clothing, sheltering, and guarding were still managed by the prison. Contrarily, in
Wines’ estimation, under the lease system “the whole control and management of the
prison . . . is turned over to the lessee, who is . . . always a party whose object is to make
money,--first out of what the convicts can earn, and next out of what can be saved from
the cost of feeding, clothing and housing them.” Moreover, according to Wines, “the
system is injurious to the prison, because the lessee . . . thinks only how he can use [the
prisoner] to the greatest pecuniary advantage, and he cares little whether the gains are
made to the profit or prejudice of the discipline and good order of the institution.”32
During Tillman’s first year in office he regretted that the majority of prisoners
would have to continue working for shares on farms and on the Columbia Canal because
the state had an additional year to fulfill on previously made contracts. Nevertheless,
Tillman was determined to reorganize the Penitentiary and make it a profitable
institution.33 Tillman’s reform of the Penitentiary began at the top; he replaced
Superintendent T. J. Lipscomb with W. Jasper Talbert. As indicated, Lipscomb had done
a commendable job at reducing the prisoner death rate and their overall wellbeing.
Despite his success in improving the treatment of prisoners, Tillman was not satisfied
with the economic situation in which Lipscomb had placed the Penitentiary. Tillman
appointed Talbert, who had been a loyal supporter during the 1890 campaign, to remedy
the institutions financial situation. Although Tillman’s appointment of Talbert might
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have seemed to his critics as a blatant example of cronyism, Talbert did increase the
Penitentiary’s profits while maintaining the humane care of prisoners that Lipscomb had
instilled. Although 1891 saw little change in the prison’s finances, due to the necessary
fulfillment of contracts for the Columbia Canal and share work on various farms, Tillman
managed to pass legislation which stipulated that the Board of Directors of the
Penitentiary were “instructed, as far as practicable, in hiring out or working convicts, to
hire or work the same on farms in healthy locations and which are exempt from danger of
overflow.”34
Newly appointed Superintendent Talbert immediately began to revamp prison
operation according to Tillman’s wishes; he started contracting the convicts at fixed
wages instead of leasing the laborers on a share basis. He also leased for $2,5000
annually the institution’s dam and hydroelectric plant on the Congaree River to the
Electric Street Railway and Light Company of Columbia. Furthermore, Talbert sent
many of the state’s convicts to work on the state-owned farm in Sumter, known as
DeSaussure Place, which had been purchased in 1890. By the end of 1892 it was clear
that the Tillman-Talbert strategy was working. In 1891 the Penitentiary’s Board of
Directors reported that convict labor had resulted in revenues of $25,922.14; the 1892
report showed earnings of $39,681.83. DeSaussure Place produced ample amounts of
corn and cotton for market, as well as food for internal consumption. In a single year the
Penitentiary had increased the revenue from convict labor alone by over $13,000. It is
also important that this spike in income did not come from any cutbacks on prisoners’
34
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essential needs; in fact the opposite occurred. In 1892 the expenditures on food for
prisoners rose from $13,232.17 the previous year to $17,169.87. Funds for clothing also
increased dramatically, from $542.58 in 1891 to $2334.93 in 1892.35 The Penitentiary
therefore had increased funding for prisoners and improved their living conditions, while
simultaneously boosting revenues to the state. The Committee for the Penitentiary in the
House of Representatives praised Superintendent Talbert and Governor Tillman
indirectly, when it reported in 1892 that “the institution [was] well kept and in excellent
condition, . . . more than self sustaining . . .[and that] the health of the prisoners for the
past year, has been unusually good and the death rate considerably less than that of
previous years.”36
Despite what seemed to be an obvious success story of both fiscal and
humanitarian reform on the part of Tillman and Talbert, the governor nevertheless heard
the usual cries of corruption from familiar voices. In spring 1891 Narcisco G. Gonzales
reported in the Columbia State that state prisoners claimed that they had insufficient food,
clothing, and medical care. If the governor refused to act and investigate these
allegations, according to Gonzales, it would prove that Talbert had been merely
appointed superintendent as a political favor, and that Tillman had a “flexible and
adjustable conscience.”37 To the credit of Talbert and Tillman, however, the Penitentiary
Board of Directors made an official investigation over several months and exonerated
35
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prison managers of any misdeeds. The inquirers found the inmates not lacking in any
essentials, especially the quality or quantity of their food. They also noted the significant
decline in the death rate, which obviously disputed any claims that Talbert had skimped
in the funding of decent food and medical care.38 Board Chairman T. J. Cunningham
asserted in his report that “the Board never at any time had occasion to find fault with . . .
[the superintendent’s] management of the institution.”39 It must be manifest that in the
case of the Penitentiary, Governor Tillman affected not only fiscal reform to benefit the
hard-pressed taxpayers, but also humanitarian reform in the living and working
conditions of convicts that progressive reformers like E. C. Wines had been urging for
decades.
Tillman proved he was willing and capable of transforming such pre-existing state
institutions as the Asylum and the Penitentiary. Nevertheless, his most ambitious,
controversial, and legacy-ensuring endeavor in state business involved an institution that
he himself created. Rivaled only by the agricultural college and the state constitution of
1895, Tillman’s forging and operation of the state liquor dispensary is arguably the most
significant venture of his political career.
While historians disagree on the merits of the state’s monopoly of the liquor
trade—many critics perceive the dispensary as another example of Tillman’s tyrannical
tactics—it is clear from the evidence available that the governor’s plan was well-studied,
practicable, and beneficial to the state’s coffers and sense of respectability. The creation
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of a state liquor dispensary was a reasonable solution to a confluence of problems in the
forms of widespread prohibitionist sentiment, the shocking abundance of saloons and
alcohol-related crimes, and the serious question of how far a government should interfere
with the freedoms of individuals and businesses. Despite the skepticism over the
dispensary’s constitutionality and the criticism over Tillman’s strict enforcement of the
law that created the institution, the plan successfully avoided outright prohibition while
curbing the proliferation of saloons and their concomitant vices of gambling and
prostitution.40
To understand Tillman’s reasoning behind the dispensary, it is crucial to first
explain the conditions that preceded it. Prohibitionist sentiment originated in South
Carolina from the same temperance movement, largely championed by women and
evangelical Christians, that began to gather steam across the United States in the 1820’s
and 1830’s. On July 4, 1838, the State Temperance Society, South Carolina’s first
statewide organization of such, met initially to discuss their plans for spreading the
gospel of abstinence from spirits. In 1842 Charleston saw the emergence of two notable
organizations: the Young Men’s Temperance Society, and a chapter of the Washington
Temperance Society.41 The liquor business, however, flourished in the state despite
ardent efforts of the antebellum societies to repeal liquor licenses, or at least to prohibit
sales to nothing under twenty gallons. The adversaries of alcohol were persistent
though, and after the Civil War they took up the banner of absolute prohibition with more
40
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promising results. In 1885 South Carolina became the first southern state to organize a
chapter of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and join the national organization.
Three years earlier the state passed a law permitting local option—towns and counties
would have the possibility to outlaw liquor in their own locality. Even more
significantly, in 1889 and 1890 the prohibitionists lost bids for statewide prohibition by
only a slim margin, and by 1891 over sixty towns and several counties were dry under the
local option law.42
Prohibitionists were appalled at the constantly growing number of saloons and the
wicked behavior these dens of vice inspired. Furthermore, they were incensed by the
cavalier manner in which the newspaper media advertised liquor. According to historian
John Evans Eubanks, “corn liquor and beer had not yet assumed the mild designation of
‘beverages’. . . but were boldly advertised under their own names, often side by side, with
the “Keely Cure” for inebriety. The Columbia State even recommended the establishment
of a government ‘Keely Cure’ to take care of the output of grogshops.”43 Anti-liquor
advocates also emphasized the high rate of crime that alcohol inspired. In 1892, just in
the time period between July 1 and September 30, reports from twenty-two cities found
that there were 577 arrests for drunkenness and public disorder. This statistic does not
include other crimes committed under the influence of alcohol.44 In his address to the
General Assembly in 1891 Governor Tillman stated that although he was no
prohibitionist, “There [were], as [he was] informed, between 700 and 800 bar-rooms in
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the State. . . . [and that] no sensible man [would] deny that one-half or three-fourths of
the crimes committed in the State [were] traceable directly to the drinking of whiskey.”45
As early as 1891 Tillman apparently wanted to curb excessive drinking in the
state and the subsequent crimes that were directly related to it. He did not, however,
consider absolute prohibition “practicable, or even desirable.” He would later say that he
did not think people could be “legislated into morality.”46 As usual, on this issue Tillman
did not ignore the financial considerations of the government or his rural supporters. He
sought a plan that would both exert a relative amount of social control and also benefit
the state’s purse, whereby tax burdens could be lifted from depression-wearied farmers.
Tillman proposed to modify the current system of issuing liquor licenses, whereby one
could obtain a license by paying $100 fees to both the county and the municipality in
which they would operate. Alternatively, Tillman’s new plan suggested that
municipalities should be barred from issuing licenses, and that all revenue obtained
through liquor permits should go to the counties and the state’s general fund. The
governor insisted that since county and state taxes—“and largely the country people”—
funded the courts that bore the expense of handling the cases caused by whiskey
drinking, the municipalities therefore had no rightful claim to profit form the licensing of
barrooms. This proposal was more than an attempt to bolster his political power at the
expense of local leaders; it was a clear example of Tillman representing the interests of
the farming class. Historians have denied that Tillman led any real class rebellion by
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citing the fact that many Tillmanite leaders were large planters and well-to-do lawyers,
and in a sense they are correct. Tillman, however, did not necessarily represent the poor
lower class against the wealthy upper class, but the rural country class against the towndwelling class. “The people in the country not only pay tribute to those who sell liquor,
by means of which the towns are beautified and adorned,” he declared, “but they pay tax
for the suppression of crime produced by the maintenance of these barrooms.”
Additionally, Tillman suggested a higher license fee, which he contended would both
increase state and county revenue, and also decrease the number of saloons.
Unfortunately for the governor, prohibitionists, liquor dealers, and municipal leaders
disapproved of his plan, and the Senate easily killed the bill.47
Despite their slight legislative defeat in 1891, prohibitionists maintained their
pressure on citizens and government officials. Strongly influenced by the efforts of the
state’s most widely read religious newspapers, the Baptist Courier and the Southern
Christian Advocate, the South Carolina Democratic Executive Committee decided to give
voters the option to express their opinion on prohibition during the August, 1892 primary.
The committee, however, clarified that the results would not be official or binding on the
elected candidates. It is also important to note that Wets and Drys (i.e., those who
opposed liquor restriction and prohibitionists) were equally dispersed throughout both the
Tillmanite and Conservative factions of the party. Almost 20,000 primary voters did not
opt for either side of the liquor issue, but among the 68,515 who did, the prohibitionists
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won a majority of about 10,000.48 A significant number of Tillmanites voted for
prohibition, so Tillman determined to pass some measure to alleviate the building
antagonism between the opponents over liquor and forestall one of the groups from
“[appealing] to the Negro as the balance of power.”49
In a November 1892 message to the General Assembly, Tillman emphasized the
point that the primary vote on prohibition had only been abstract, “without any definite
legislation being indicated.” The governor also argued that prohibition laws were usually
ineffectual, cost-prohibitive, and unenforceable. Moreover, he added that “all classes,
men and women alike, feel, at times, the need of stimulants, and many who are never
guilty of excess in their use resent any law infringing upon personal liberty.” Tillman
also reiterated his earlier point that the “liquor men” and towns profited from the alcohol
business, while country people suffered from it due to increased taxes. As he viewed the
issue, South Carolina citizens were sadly already divided along town and country lines,
“and the wisdom of further division [was] questionable.” The governor recognized that
both current options—outright prohibition or unregulated trade—would continue to
exacerbate the antagonism between the friends and enemies of prohibition.50
During the 1892 legislative term there were several bills introduced offering
various methods of deciding the liquor question; the two most popular were a statewide
referendum, and prohibition with exceptions for medicinal purposes. Eventually
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legislators compromised and put forth what was commonly known as the Roper bill.
This measure prohibited the sale of alcohol except for medicinal purposes, and also called
for a State Commissioner who would scrupulously oversee distribution in order to
prevent abuses of the medicinal trade. The bill easily passed in the House, but
experienced defeat in the Senate. Tillman was determined to pass some measure on the
liquor issue before the legislature adjourned for the year. He collaborated with Senator
John Gary Evans, an important supporter from Aiken, to introduce a measure that would
prohibit the private sale of liquor and establish a state-owned liquor dispensary. Tillman
saw this as a viable path to eliminating saloon life and thus pleasing prohibitionists, while
refraining from restricting the freedoms of moderate drinkers. Most importantly to
Tillman, he saw the dispensary as a potential boon to the state’s income that could
decrease overall tax rates and further please his country-based supporters.51
Tillman’s knowledge of the dispensary system is primarily attributable to T. Larry
Gantt, editor of the Columbia Daily Register, a pro-Tillman organ that was established
with a promise of the state’s printing business. Gantt was formerly a newspaper reporter
in Athens, Georgia, where the city had instituted a municipal liquor dispensary based on
the Gothenburg system. He convinced Tillman that the compromise would destroy the
antagonism between the Wets and Drys, and that it had brought Athens significant
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revenue without the need for additional taxes.52 The dispensary bill was introduced as an
amendment to the Roper prohibition bill, so as to avoid the necessity of three readings
that was required under House rules. Opponents of the bill insisted that the “amendment”
was not relevant to the original bill and unsuccessfully attempted to filibuster. Although
there was fierce opposition to the bill by prohibitionists and liquor purveyors, Tillman,
with the help of Senator Evans secured enough support for passage. The Dispensary Bill
became law just in time to beat the legislature’s scheduled adjournment of December 24,
1892.53
The most essential function of the South Carolina Dispensary Law, which was set
to take effect on July 1, 1893, was to prohibit the sale of intoxicating spirits by both
private individuals and companies, and to reserve that function solely to state
government. The law prescribed the creation of the Board of Control, consisting of the
governor, attorney general, and comptroller general that would supervise the dispensary’s
operation. It also provided for the appointment of a Commissioner who would purchase
all alcohol for legal sale in the state, and then distribute the liquor to county dispensers.
Those agents were to be appointed by County Boards of Control. Each county received
one dispensary, excepting Charleston and Richmond, which received ten and three
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respectively due to their large populations. The state commissioner and the county
dispensers were to be men not known to be addicted to alcohol or to have ever been
engaged in the liquor business. Additionally, they were obligated to post bonds of $3,000
to insure that they adhered to the new liquor laws. The revenue generated by the
dispensaries would be divided among the counties, municipalities, and the state.
Specifically, the state would receive one-half of the profit, and the county and
municipality in which the liquor was sold would each receive one-fourth. This plan was
more appealing to municipal leaders than Tillman’s 1891 suggestion, which would have
cut out municipalities from all liquor revenue.54
The Dispensary Law may not have completely satisfied adherents of outright
prohibition, but it did make the purchase of liquor a much more complex procedure than
it had been. Furthermore it would now be a matter of public record. Persons wishing to
purchase liquor from the dispensary would have to submit a written request including
their name, address, the volume and type of liquor desired, and declaring for whose use
the alcohol was intended. Additionally, no dispenser was allowed to sell spirits to anyone
whom they knew to be a minor, to be currently intoxicated, or to be prone to excessive
indulgence. Liquor purchases were only to be made in sealed packages between sunrise
and sunset, and opening or consuming said liquor on dispensary premises was expressly
forbidden.55 It is also important to note that the law did not force dispensaries upon
counties that did not wish to have them. A majority of electors of any municipality could
vote to preclude the establishment of a dispensary in their community.
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The Dispensary Law immediately faced harsh criticism from both sides of the
prohibition issue. In an article, “An Obnoxious Law,” J. F. Clinkscales of the Anderson
Intelligencer insisted that the liquor trade was not a proper government function and
condemned Governor Tillman of practicing “mad paternalism.”56 Narcisco G. Gonzales
of the Columbia State maintained that Tillman’s sole purpose behind the dispensary law
was destroying free business in order to collect huge profits for the state.57 Several
church leaders admonished their members for purchasing any sort of liquor, dispensary or
otherwise, and worked with other prohibitionists to try and keep the local dispensaries
from receiving the necessary signatures on petitions for establishment.58
In an address to the General Assembly in November 1893, Tillman refuted critics
of the Dispensary Law by describing its benefits. He argued that the incentive for profit
had been eliminated, along with ambitious purveyors, which would therefore decrease the
overall consumption of liquor. Additionally he declared, “the concomitants of ice, sugar,
lemons, &c., being removed there is not the same inclination to drink remaining, and the
closing of the saloons, especially at night, and the prohibition of its sale by the drink,
destroy the enticements and seductions which have caused so many men and boys to be
led astray and enter on the downward course.”59 The governor also stressed the
progressive ideas of government regulation of quality standards, maintaining, “a pure
article is guaranteed, as it is subject to chemical analysis,” and that “treating is stopped,
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as the bottles are not opened on the premises.”60 The dispensary law did stipulate that the
state commissioner “shall not sell to the County Dispensers any intoxicating or fermented
liquors except such as have been tested by the chemist of the South Carolina College and
declared to be pure and unadulterated.”61 This feature of the legislation was a
comparable precursor of the progressive era Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. Evidence
of the governor’s genuine concern for providing residents with pure quality liquor can be
seen in the care with which he selected a manufacturer, as well as the study he put into
the subject. Along with his appointed commissioner David H. Traxler, a tee-totaling
Baptist from Timmonsville in Florence County, Tillman visited Louisville, Cincinnati,
and Pittsburgh to inspect distillers and bottling plants. He eventually contracted with
George Hubbell of the Mill Creek Distilling Company of Cincinnati. After sampling
different varieties and reading on liquor distillation, Tillman, who seldom drank alcohol,
comprised a system of labeling whiskey barrels with one to three X’s to ensure quality
standards.62
One of the most effective statistics Tillman employed in defense of the
Dispensary Law was the reduction in public drunkenness. He showed records comparing
the number of arrests for drunkenness from July 1 to September 30 for both 1892 and
1893. While there were 577 such arrests during the summer of the year prior to the
dispensary, records for the same period in 1893 showed 287 arrests, a reduction of 290.63
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The governor also commended the Dispensary Law for the income it had secured for the
state. He asserted that between the fifty-one dispensaries that were in operation by
October 1893, they had collected a net profit of $32,198.16 for the state—an equal
amount would be split between the counties and municipalities where the liquor was
sold.64 Finally, though he did not address them specifically, Tillman spoke to those
disgruntled citizens who were potential third-party bolters. Although the People’s Party
had failed to make significant gains in the 1892 presidential elections, it was still
relatively strong and was gearing up for the next round of contests. Tillman appealed to
the might-be party bolters when he lauded the dispensary law as the destruction of the
“whiskey rings” that had “been the curse of every municipality in the State, and [had]
always controlled municipal elections.” To third-party radicals “rings” and “trusts” were
the hated money power that kept the common man from prospering. Tillman assured
those in his state that the whiskey ring had been “torn up root and branch” and that “the
influence of the bar-keeper as a political manipulator [was] absolutely destroyed.”65 Just
how much political manipulation bar-keepers had ever actually instigated is debatable.
Nevertheless, the most salient aspect of this point is that Tillman did reach out to
potential populists with other appeals than the fear of Negro equality or Reconstructionera Republican dominance.
Apart from the criticism of the Dispensary Law itself, ardent opposition
developed to the tactics Tillman employed to enforce the law. The original act contained
a clause stating, “the governor shall have authority to appoint one or more state
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constables . . . to see that this act is enforced.”66 Tillman employed constables across the
state to search out and seize illegal liquor. The most flagrant violators of the law were
illegal saloons known as “blind tigers,” which purchased illegal alcohol from
manufacturers outside the state. Constables used disguises in many towns to infiltrate
illegal whiskey sellers. They also drew ire from citizens by employing strong-arm tactics
and searching property for no other apparent reason than to bully citizens. Although
Tillman genuinely attempted to appoint trustworthy, reasonable men to the position of
constable, some were unnecessarily rough and rude when searching potential violators.67
In the constables’ defense, however, in many cases the public was as unruly and violent
as the constables who were trying to enforce the law. In early August 1893 at Sumter
angry crowds threw rotten eggs at constables who had performed legal searches and
discovered contraband liquor. A constable was seriously bruised after a fight with a local
rowdy. Tillman was incensed at the public’s rebellious behavior, and he subsequently
supplied each of the constables with Colt revolvers, declaring that the law would be
enforced even if it meant killing someone.68 Tillman’s resolve to enforce the law only
strengthened the determination of his opposition: his own brother George Tillman, a state
representative, declared, “I’ll be damned if I don’t shoot the first spy that enters my
residence or opens a package of my goods sneaking around hunting liquor.”69
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In late March 1894 the building tension between the dispensary constables and the
public erupted at Darlington. The town was a stronghold of anti-Tillman sentiment, and
also home to multiple illegal saloons. The governor sent four constables to search for
liquor law violators, and rumors spread throughout the town that the men had been
ordered by Tillman to search private residences without warrants. The reports vary as to
what actually happened at Darlington. Tillman’s constables claimed that a large mob of
armed men followed them, and that the unruly townspeople “guyed, cursed, and abused”
them.70 Another unnamed anti-Tillmanite, however, insisted that there were “very few
citizens who were armed” and that all of the troubled was due to “the meddling of the
constables.”71 Nevertheless, Tillman ordered eighteen additional constables as well as
the Sumter militia to Darlington under orders to quell the uproar. The situation calmed
for the day, and on the following, March 30, the original four constables and their
reinforcements attempted to leave the city. Still upset, however, a group of citizens
followed the constables, and after several arguments and accusations, Constable John B.
McClendon shot and killed Darlington resident Frank E. Norment. Consequently, an
angry mob chased the constables into a nearby swamp and some rioters fired shots into a
train carrying constables who had not even been present at the preceding altercation.72
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The “Darlington Riot” ignited what looked sure to become statewide anarchy.
Tillman ordered units from the Columbia militia to Darlington with the mission of
suppressing the rioters. The Columbia units, as well as those of Charleston, Sumter, and
Newberry refused the governor’s orders due to reports from the Columbia State that
proclaimed the riot to have been sparked by the constables attacking innocent citizens.
Additionally, mobs looted militia armories in Columbia, Florence, and Chester; separate
mobs also ransacked dispensary buildings in Florence and Darlington. Amidst the chaos
frenzied citizens disseminated rumors that Governor Tillman had been assassinated.73
Although some militia units had defied the governor’s orders, many other units
from across the state rushed to Columbia to defend Tillman, the state dispensary, and the
governor’s mansion. In an address to the General Assembly Tillman personally
recognized nineteen militia units and eight volunteer units that had come to the aid of the
governor and the state. Tillman ordered the responders to protect the capitol, to enforce
martial law in Darlington and Florence, and to occupy telegraph and railroad lines in
order to prevent inflammatory reports of the situation. These decisive actions prevented
further rioting, and by April 5 martial law was suspended and the dispensaries were
reopened. The governor dismissed and verbally scolded those militia units that had
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disobeyed his orders, and praised those, especially the Edgefield Huzzars, who had
proved loyal.74
Although Gonzales of the State and Hemphill of the News and Courier continued
to criticize Tillman for his unnecessarily harsh actions during the Darlington riot, most
state citizens approved of his determination to maintain law and order.75 Even Alfred B.
Williams of the usually anti-Tillman Greenville News declared, “Governor Tillman’s acts
during the trying and memorable week just past have been sensible, conciliatory, and in
all respects proper.”76 No matter what people personally felt about the Dispensary Law,
the overwhelming sentiment both in, and outside the state, was that the governor was
correct to promote and maintain order in the face of widespread lawlessness. Governor
Tillman’s reform and management of state institutions, those both preexisting and newly
created, show him to be both progressive-minded and financially responsible. He
restructured the Lunatic Asylum’s Board of Regents and replaced a corrupt
superintendent with a physician who proved talented and concerned with the humane
treatment of patients. Although some historians have suggested that he sought to remove
harmless patients to their respective counties in order to recuperate financial losses from
the Coosaw Mining Company case, Tillman had endorsed that plan in his inaugural
address, well before there was any loss of mining royalties. In the case of the state
Penitentiary Tillman ended the convict-lease system in favor of the more human contract
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system and established a thriving state farm, while simultaneously reducing the death
rates of prisoners through improvement of food and medical care. Thus, prison reformers
never mentioned South Carolina alongside the notorious penal systems in Mississippi,
Georgia, and North Carolina.
Although the Dispensary Law has been routinely used as proof of Tillman’s
hunger for power and control over every function of the state, it was actually a practical
solution to a growing problem at the time. The feud between strict prohibitionists and
free-liquor proponents was at its zenith upon Tillman’s election to the governor’s office.
It was not a problem of his creation, but it was his responsibility to remedy the situation.
The Dispensary Law provided for the individual’s freedom to consume alcohol, while
also seriously restricting the degradations that accompanied widespread saloons. Since
the opponents over the liquor issue were at diametric poles of opinion, perhaps the best
evidence that the law was the only viable solution was the fact that neither side endorsed
it. For those who insisted the governor enforced the law too stringently, the case should
be made that any effective prohibition law would have required as much or more force to
implement. Alternatively, no limitations whatsoever would have perpetuated the rampant
drunkenness and criminality that a large portion of the state detested so fiercely. Tillman
struck a reasonable, and progressive, middle course.
Tillman’s economic management of the state’s institutions meant fewer tax
burdens on farmers and other hard-pressed citizens. They saw efficient government, the
assault on corrupt officials, and attacks against the “whiskey rings” as efforts with
consideration of their welfare as the foremost principle. Therefore, Farmers’ Alliance
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members and laborers had little reason to leave the beloved Democracy when Tillman
was making the party their champion. Tillman’s white-supremacist views do not,
however, nullify the other progressive feats he achieved. Furthermore, he had virtually
no need to scare would-be populists back into the Democratic fold with tales of Negro
dominance, for his governing of the state proved that he was a reformer, a friend to the
farmer, as well as the enemy of corruption.
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TILLMAN AND BUSINESS REFORM
“Tillmanism was a political machine, not a social or political revolution.”1 This
assertion of historian Walter Edgar has been widely agreed upon and essentially
unchallenged by recent historians of the New South, the populist-progressive era, and
Benjamin Tillman. Additionally, scholars have stressed the notion that Tillman’s cries
for agricultural reform were primarily rhetorical, insisting that he did not share the
sympathy for the lower classes or the bitterness against national evils that the more
radical agrarian organizations espoused. According to historian William J. Cooper,
“Unlike them, Tillman paid little attention to Wall Street, the trusts, or any other national
issue; he called South Carolina his only concern.”2 In actuality, however, Ben Tillman
initiated tangible state-level reform measures while governor that served to mitigate
agrarian discontent, and consequently averted a third-party movement in South Carolina.
It was Tillman’s reforms that precluded a populist uprising, not racist demagoguery
alarming citizens of the evils associated with a third party that would need to court black
voters to succeed. It is true that Tillman never fully endorsed all of the Farmers’
Alliance’s platforms, never considered a third-party bolt, and focused almost solely on
state issues before his election to the U.S. Senate in 1894. Furthermore, Tillman’s
abrasive personality and his disavowal of the socio-political equality of African
Americans makes it easy for modern historians to discount the entirety of his career as
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the political machinations of a duplicitous and power-hungry white-supremacist. This
attitude, however, is a mistake. Although Ben Tillman may not have led a radical
“revolution,” for the place and time in which he lived, his two terms as governor proved
to be the most forward-looking, reasonable, and progressive that most people could have
expected. While historians eagerly cite the criticisms of contemporary Conservatives3
who hated Tillman as evidence intended to downplay his popularity, it is important to
remember that the Conservative reign of power had been ideologically rooted in a
backward-looking non-progressivism. According to one of the most notable historians of
post-Reconstruction South Carolina, William J. Cooper Jr., “during their fourteen year
hegemony the South Carolina Conservatives tried to recreate the ideals of that polity they
esteemed above all other: ante-bellum South Carolina.”4 Therefore, in light of the fact
that his predecessors were intent on recreating the pre-Civil War South, Ben Tillman’s
reform measures—despite his white supremacist ideology—appear all the more
progressive by comparison. Even if Tillman was a promoter of white supremacy, such
sentiment was not enough to stop third-party movements in other Southern and Western
states, and would also not have been enough in South Carolina. Furthermore, Tillman’s
stance against monopolies and railroads, although not identical to populist sentiment,
favored the common farmer and was similar enough to Populist platforms to preclude a
significant third-party movement in South Carolina.
3
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It has been established that Tillman was primarily focused on state issues as
opposed to national ones, and his critics have used this as another weapon in their arsenal
to prove he was no true agrarian reformer; the most prominent agrarian organizations,
such as the Grange and the Farmers’ Alliance, addressed national issues like trusts and
the money supply. Nevertheless, within South Carolina Tillman sought to create a more
efficient government and remedy problems of the textile, phosphate, and railroad
industries. It does make sense that a governor would be chiefly occupied with state
issues, and Tillman clearly worked vigorously on national matters during his twenty-three
years as U.S. Senator. Tillman’s overall strategy to aid farmers and other struggling
South Carolinians was regulation of business and the operation of an economical
government that would result in a decreased tax burden, fair shipping rates, and better
educational opportunities. During his first term as governor, Tillman initiated legislation
that attacked the problems he had denounced since 1885, and had articulated more
specifically in his inaugural address in 1890.
The first issue to be examined here—improvement of conditions and working
hours for laborers in cotton mills—was not necessarily one of Tillman’s chief concerns;
cotton mill regulation was actually the objective of a few of Tillman’s devotees.
Nevertheless, the subject is important for two reasons: first, it represents one of the initial
instances of social legislation enacted by Tillman’s reform government; and second, it
serves as an example of Tillman yielding to the wishes of other members of his
movement, as opposed to continuously playing the tyrant who brooked no difference of
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opinion. Furthermore, the issue is manifestly noteworthy since the textile industry would
become a leading source of employment and income for the state in the next century.
Cotton mill operations existed in ante-bellum South Carolina; however, they were
relatively small-scale and unimportant until the establishment of William Gregg’s
Graniteville (Aiken County) mill in 1845. Even then, there was no boom in the business
remotely comparable to that of the later part of the century. In the years between the
conclusion of the Civil War and 1880, the textile industry demonstrated considerable
growth, but in the 1880’s the business escalated so much that it rivaled railroads as the
state’s most prominent business. State government had been influential in the promotion
of cotton mills, as well as all types of industry. To combat the inimical economic effects
of the Panic of 1873, the state’s Reconstruction government passed a law excluding “any
individual or association of individuals” from taxes “upon the property or capital
employed or invested in such manufactures or enterprises.”5 By 1900 the cotton
enterprise would have invested capital worth approximately $40,000,000, and would
usurp railroads as the dominant business of South Carolina.6
The conservative Democrats who “redeemed” the government in 1876 adopted
the tax-exemption law for industry as one of their own. And the prominent Francis W.
Dawson of the Charleston News and Courier heartily endorsed the law.7 Despite the
widespread support from journalists, the legislature finally repealed the tax-exemption in
5

South Carolina, Acts and Joint Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South
Carolina, XV, 513-14; Cooper, Conservative Regime, 120.
6
Gustavus Galloway Williamson Jr., “Cotton Manufacturing in South Carolina, 1865-1892,”
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Dept. of History, John Hopkins University, 1954), 4, 63, 68, 92,
94, 105; Cooper, Conservative Regime, 119.
7
Charleston News and Courier, November 27, 1884, November 25, December 23-25, 1885.

96

1885 due to growing opposition that denounced the fact that poor citizens received no
such charity from the government.8 By the time Ben Tillman reached the governor’s
office, tax-exemption was a non-issue; however, the conditions of cotton mills and the
hours of laborers had become a significant one. Yet, it must be made clear that Tillman
was not inherently a foe of industry, even if he was the champion of the farmers’ cause.
One of the state’s most salient pro-industry advocates, Daniel A. Tompkins, was a close
friend of Tillman; also, highly influential Tillman leaders including Daniel K. Norris and
Ira Jones were thoroughly invested in cotton mills.9 Just as those who had led the fight
against tax-exemption, Tillman believed that those best equipped to pay—big-money
industries—should shoulder their fair share of the tax burden.
Governor Tillman, a self-proclaimed reformer who esteemed farming and farmers
above all else, nurtured little sympathy for the factory worker. In 1892 he loudly
proclaimed that he would “rather deal with the negro any day than the damn factory
class.”10 There were, however, significant members of the Tillman movement who
genuinely desired to ameliorate the conditions of this new class of “lint heads.” In 1892
Joshua Ashley, a advocate of mill workers from Anderson who was subsequently dubbed
“Citizen Josh,” proposed legislation that would limit mill hours to ten per day, or a sixty
hour week. Cotton mill magnates balked at the proposal. James L. Orr, president of the
Piedmont Mills, insisted that the imposition of a sixty-hour workweek would destroy all
8
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the mills in the state, and Ellison A. Smyth of the Pelzer Mills argued that South Carolina
mills would be unable to compete with those of other Southern states and New England.11
Although Tillman might not have instigated or even cared about legislation to benefit
mill workers, he willingly supported a proposal to which Orr and his ilk so vehemently
opposed. During the legislative debate, a Tillman supporter and future governor and
champion of white mill laborers, Coleman Livingston Blease, declared to the mill
owners, “If you have to buy any capital by murdering women and children, for God’s
sake let it go!”12
Eventually, after a compromise that set mill hours at sixty-six a week, the
legislation passed. Tillman had shown a willingness to accept a cause of his supporters
for which he had no particular affection, suggesting that he was not quite as domineering
as some scholars maintain. Furthermore, at least in the public view, he had shown his
eagerness to combat the moneyed industry men in the name of the common man.
Finally, the Reform leaders had managed, according to Tillman’s biographer, “a
beginning in a type of legislation sanctioned by the progressive thought of the age.”13
Among the first state problems Tillman confronted with personal vigor was the
phosphate industry and the government-sanctioned monopoly of the Coosaw Mining
Company. Speaking of better management of the state’s phosphate beds, Tillman
stressed that “nothing with which the Legislature has to deal can equal this in importance
11
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and value to the taxpayer.”14 Before briefly describing the history of phosphate mining in
South Carolina, as well Ben Tillman’s subsequent battle with the Coosaw Mining
Company, it is important to recognize that at this moment Tillman was beginning to act
the part of a legitimate reformer. Even though he publicly denigrated third-party
radicalism, and would go on to deny being a Populist, by taking on big capital and
industry in the name of the hard-working taxpayer, Tillman actually embodied what
would-be party bolters wanted. One Southern Populist, J.A. Transom of Pfafftown,
North Carolina attempted to summarize the core principles embodied in populist ideology
and formally espoused in the various demands of its 1892 Omaha platform. He insisted
that if the platform needed shortening, “ ‘Tis easily done. The one word ‘antimonopoly’
expresses every demand in, and outside the Omaha platform necessary to establish justice
among us.”15 Tillman’s fight to destroy the Coosaw Company’s monopoly on phosphate
beds was right in line with populist sentiment. He even invoked the language of
Alliancemen and future Populists when he denounced the phosphate industry as the
“octopus which . . . has kept the water turbid with its inky fluid; and while those on the
inside have many of them grown rich, the taxpayers and their representatives know very
little about it and every effort has been made to keep the facts from the public.”16 This
assault on a moneyed monopoly contradicts scholarly assessments that “once in office the
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Reformers were not nearly as revolutionary as they had appeared on the campaign
trail.”17
Phosphate mining, along with railroads and cotton mills, was one of the leading
enterprises in the largely agricultural South Carolina. Unlike the other industries,
however, phosphate mining did not begin in earnest until after the Civil War, which had
halted its first attempt at mining in 1860. In 1843 Edmund Ruffin, the notorious fireeating secessionist, conducted a geological survey and reported marl deposits located
primarily along the coastal river beds between Charleston and Beaufort. These deposits
were rich in carbonate of lime, a vital component for manufactured fertilizer. The
Charleston Mining and Manufacturing Company, the state’s first such company, began
operation in 1867—by 1870 there were twelve more companies engaged in phosphate
mining.18 This healthy competition, however, was short-lived.
In 1870 the state legislature granted privileges to the River and Marine Company
to mine phosphate in all the navigable rivers of the state for twenty-one years. In 1876 the
General Assembly gave the Coosaw Mining Company exclusive rights to mine on the
Coosaw River. After being directed to investigate the charters of the various mining
companies on the river in a special legislative session in 1877, Attorney General James
Conner recommended to lawmakers that a monopoly be granted to a single company
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because of the large amount of capital required to finance such an operation.19 Although
there were other phosphate deposits in the Lowcountry, the Coosaw River was where the
preponderance of the rock resided. Consequently, the Coosaw Company enjoyed the
benefit of mining the richest deposit, at that time in the entire country, without the threat
of competition. Evidently, the Conservative government deemed free-market
competition to be an insurmountable obstacle to the fledgling industry. By the time the
Conservatives had lost the state’s executive office there was a surfacing disagreement
about the legitimacy of the company’s monopoly on the Coosaw.
During his inaugural address in 1890, Governor Tillman elucidated a discrepancy
in the Coosaw Mining Company’s mandate. While he understood that the firm’s lease
was to expire on March 1 1891, he asserted that a large stockholder of the company had
told him that their “tenure [was] not a lease expiring in 1891, but a contract running for
all time.”20 Tillman went on to explain that the Coosaw phosphate deposits were
possibly the richest in the world; and while the mining company’s shareholders had
become extraordinarily rich, the company had paid nothing to the state for its franchise.
This was a bit of exaggeration, since the state’s Reconstruction government of 1870 had
established a royalty of one dollar for every ton of phosphate mined, and the 1878
legislature had upheld that price when granting exclusive rights to the Coosaw Company.
In 1879 the state received $98,000 in phosphate royalties; by 1890 the industry had
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expanded, paying a royalty of $237,149.06.21 In 1877 the state had also created the
position of a phosphate commissioner whose primary duties would be to ensure that
mining firms worked within their charters and to collect royalties. To Governor Tillman,
however, neither the commissioner nor the current royalty rate was exacting nearly
enough from the mining industry as compared to what he demanded they rightfully owed
to the state and the independent taxpayers.
As early as 1886, well before he held any government position, Tillman’s
criticisms of the phosphate industry had forced the legislature to appoint a commission to
probe the efficiency of the mining situation. The commission suggested a new plan in
1887 that would have mining companies pay a set fee of $175,000, with a one-dollar
royalty on every ton over 175,000. The Senate killed the measure by a vote that showed
Tillmanites and Conservatives voting on each side.22 In 1890, however, Tillman, as the
newly elected governor, had a far greater opportunity to change the phosphate-mining
establishment than simply assaulting it through rhetoric and influencing ineffectual
commissions. He promoted the immediate commencement of a new survey to fairly
judge the value of the phosphate deposits, the fixing of a new royalty rate more favorable
to the state coffers, and also opening up the territories to competition by offering leases in
each newly proposed district to the highest bidder. At that point Tillman announced that
phosphate rock was worth $7 per ton, and the mining companies’ cost was at the most
$4.25 per ton, royalties included. Tillman insisted the cost figure was most likely far
21
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less, and therefore the mining companies were collecting unnecessarily huge profit
margins from state-owned lands, and subsequently the overstressed taxpayers had carried
the burden of funding the government. Tillman stressed in his inaugural address that, “the
expiration of the Coosaw lease in March next makes it possible, in my judgment, to
double the income of the State from the phosphate royalty without injuring the industry
or interfering unduly with any vested right.”23 He proved his assaults to be more than
mere rhetoric meant to pander to his constituency’s mistrust of monopolies, and soon he
was embroiled in an all-out war with the Coosaw Company.
In January 1891 the state legislature passed (at the urging of Tillman) the
Phosphate Commission Act, which created a five-member commission, including the
governor, with the mission of conducting a survey of the phosphate beds and then
recommending a course of action to the General Assembly.24 Tillman and the
commission made a relatively brief survey of the phosphate region and concluded that the
$10,000 appropriated by the legislature was woefully insufficient to fund a major and
thorough assessment of the value of those mineral deposits. The phosphate was so far
spread, and so deep within the earth, that the equipment needed to adequately survey it
was beyond the means of the state’s treasury. The commissioners did, however, employ
$2,313.30 of the appropriation towards the purchase of a small steamboat so that the
inspector (a position created by the Phosphate Act) could “exercise . . . intelligent
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supervision of the mining, and to enable him to see that the royalty was honestly paid.”25
Although the creation of a new Phosphate Commission and inspector who would make
unannounced visits on the mining companies was progress, Tillman was dismayed that
the full-scale investigation of the rock deposits seemed cost-prohibitory. Nevertheless,
he remained intent on destroying the Coosaw Company’s monopoly and opening up the
river to competition.
In response to Tillman’s threats in his campaign and during his inaugural address
to destroy the Coosaw Mining Company’s exclusive rights along the river, Robert Adger,
the company’s manager, informed Tillman that they would seek legal retribution if the
Phosphate Commission “aid[ed] or encourage[d]” any other mining operation to trespass
on their territory. Additionally, he maintained that the Coosaw Company had abided by
all of the stipulations of the 1876 contract, and enjoined the governor not to threaten the
mutually beneficial relationship between the company and the state.26 Notwithstanding
Adger’s warnings of impending litigation, on March 1, 1891 Tillman and the Phosphate
Commission formally took possession of the Coosaw River and issued licenses to three
separate companies to mine within the region. Two of the firms did enter the river, but
were prohibited from mining by the order of a Federal judge acting on the complaint of
the Coosaw Company. Tillman insisted that Judge Charles Simonton had acted
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improperly by treating the Phosphate Commissioners as if they were private citizens and
not state officials.27 In addition to securing the injunction that kept the other mining
companies out of their contested river, the Coosaw Company also brought suit against the
Phosphate Commissioners on the basis that the Act that had created the Commission in
1890 was unconstitutional since it contravened the 1876 contract between the company
and the state. In response, Tillman and the Commissioners refused the company’s
request to continue mining until the matter had been settled in court.28 The case made its
way through the U.S. Court of Appeals and on to the U.S. Supreme Court, where in April
1892 the country’s highest judicial body ruled the 1890 law constitutional and confirmed
the undertakings of the Phosphate Commission.29 Tillman had achieved what he set out
to do; namely to destroy the “octopus” that was growing fat off the state’s riches.
However, not all had necessarily proceeded as he might have wished.
When he addressed the General Assembly on November 24, 1891 Governor
Tillman admitted that up to that time the stoppage of the Coosaw Company’s operations
had resulted in a loss of $52,636.60 for the state; by the time litigation ended the total
loss was estimated at $62,000.30 Instead of filling up the state’s cashbox with increased
royalties, Tillman’s crusade against the hated monopoly had deprived the state of crucial
funds. Nevertheless, Tillman still insisted that breaking the company’s stranglehold on
the industry would open up competition and in the near future produce a huge influx of
27
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royalties. Many citizens supported his efforts despite the loss of revenue for the state.
Farmers’ movement supporters from Spartanburg proclaimed that they would continue to
support the governor even “if the royalty is reduced to almost nothing.”31 More
importantly, newspaper editors across the state—and noticeably those from usually antiTillman sheets—praised the governor for steadfastly upholding the rights of the state
against the Coosaw Company.32
Ironically, and unfortunately for Tillman’s legacy, the battle with the Coosaw
Company did not open the door for increased competition and greater royalties. Instead,
during the time the Coosaw Company was out of business in South Carolina, newly
discovered phosphate deposits in Florida essentially proved to be the end of phosphate
royalties for Palmetto state coffers. The Florida phosphate was of a higher grade, more
abundant, and could be mined at less expense than that of the South Carolina rock.
Subsequently, phosphate that had commanded $7.00 per ton before the U.S. Supreme
Court ruling afterwards fetched at the most $3.50.33 Despite the fact that Tillman’s battle
with the Coosaw Mining Company had resulted in a major loss of state revenue, his
willingness to act on his pledges to the taxpayers should not be ignored. No one could
have foreseen the discovery of the abundant supply of phosphate in Florida; moreover,
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even though Tillman’s halting of the Coosaw Company’s operation accelerated the move
of mining companies to Florida, the shift would have eventually occurred regardless of
his actions. Tillman had promised to topple a monopoly that he and many others—not
just Tillmanites—considered to be profiting unfairly at the loss of the state; he did exactly
what he had promised.
In a similar method with which Tillman approached the phosphate industry, he
attempted—with an arguable degree of success—to regulate the railroad industry. While
Tillman never endorsed the radical view of Alliance members and Populists that railroads
and other public utilities should be publicly owned and operated, he believed the burden
of taxes needed to run the government should be shifted from the poor agricultural class
to those, for example railroads, who were thought to be best equipped to pay it. It may be
argued that railroads—due to the enormous capital needed for operation—were just as
needful of tax leniency as individual farmers. Furthermore, the service they provided
opened markets to farmers and increased the acreage of land that might prove profitable.
Historian Gabriel Kolko has even argued that in general, railroads were usually in favor
of government regulation because it stabilized a business bedeviled by cutthroat
competition.34 Nevertheless, to the poor agricultural classes of the late nineteenth
century, railroads were considered to be one of the biggest agents of oppression.
Derision for the money power and railroad barons like Jay Gould was thick in the
rhetoric of agrarian movements of the time. In 1891 prominent Populist leader Ignatius
Donnelly of Minnesota argued that the vital question one must ask in determining if a
34
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political platform was truly intent on reform was: “Is it an honest attempt to suppress the
monopolies, which recent legislation has fostered?”35 N. B. Ashby, a prominent lecturer
for the Northern Farmers’ Alliance, argued that “the railroad by nature is a monopoly. It
controls the commerce of the country. This control gives it the power to levy taxes and
collect tribute from every individual who buys or sells.”36 Ashby and Tillman did not
share the exact proposals for remedying the “railroad problem.” Ashby insisted that
railroad capital was vastly overvalued, and that farmers and other small shippers were
assuming the difference between the actual value and the real value in the form of
exorbitant shipping rates. He also advocated government ownership of all railroads, a
central plank in the Omaha platform.37 Tillman, however, maintained that carriers in
South Carolina accepted the undervaluation of their property in order to benefit from
lower taxes. While he wanted to increase the assessment of the railroads’ property and
consequently their taxes—an action diametrically opposed to Ashby’s proposal of public
ownership—he also intended to create a strong railroad commission with the power to
prevent unnecessarily high rates. It will be shown that Tillman’s plan in effect sought to
achieve the same goal of the Populists—the alleviation of railroad oppression of the
farmers—only through somewhat different means. Despite arguments against the
underlying motives, the necessity, or even the ultimate success of Tillman’s push for
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stricter railroad regulation, the simple fact is that it was another tangible effort to fulfill
his earlier promises of reform.
Railroads had long been a symbol of industrial development and modernization in
South Carolina. The 136-mile South Carolina Rail Road, which connected Charleston
and Hamburg on the Savannah River, was the longest railroad in the world when it
opened in 1833. Although efforts by the ante-bellum wealthy elite of the state to connect
South Carolina with the West were unsuccessful, by 1860 there was 987 miles of line in
the state. Even though the Civil War devastated much of the railroad system, investment
and production eventually resumed, and by 1890 the state was laced by 2,297 miles of
roads.38 During the period of Conservative control of the state, railroads grew rapidly
while the regulation and taxation of said carriers fluctuated in major degrees of
efficiency.
Two primary factors went into the decision of the Conservative leadership to
attempt some control over the state’s railroads: first, most of the roads had come under
control of capital and ownership outside of the state, a circumstance that alerted fears of
the dreaded alien rule of Reconstruction; secondly, rising freight rates were exacerbating
the pain that farmers felt due to low prices for agricultural staples, and tariff-protected
prices of goods manufactured in the North. In 1878 D. Wyatt Aiken, a state Grange
leader and Democratic congressman, petitioned the legislature to create a railroad
38
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commission to oversee the industry. To support the necessity of his request, Aiken
demonstrated that the cost of shipping cotton from Abbeville to Charleston was so
exorbitant via the railroad that farmers elected instead to haul their load in wagons to
Greenville. Due to the power and cupidity of the railroad barons, Aiken insisted the state
needed a regulatory railroad commission.39 Lawmakers were willing to act on Aiken’s
request since it was widely approved; however, they were wary of attacking the railroads
too forcefully. The legislature responded by creating a one-man commission of
Confederate Brigadier and wartime governor Milledge Luke Bonham, with only
“advisory and supervisory powers.”40
Bonham soon realized that his position was ineffectual, and in 1880 reported to
the members of the General Assembly the many problems of the railroad conditions and
asked them to give the commission more authority, specifically the power to set freight
and passenger rates. In 1880, after a newspaper campaign for better regulation by
Charleston News and Courier editor, Francis W. Dawson, and a formal request by
Senator Augustine Smythe, the legislature decided to investigate the problem and report
at its next session. They nominated Smythe to lead the commission.41 In 1881 Senator
Smythe’s committee recommended a stronger railroad commission to the legislature, and
after several modifications and narrow votes in the House and Senate, finally both bodies
39
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passed a law in December 1882 that established a three-person commission with power to
set rates. Subsequently, Bonham had real authority and rates were indeed lowered
significantly.42
The 1882 law did not for long remain popular with everyone. One segment of the
population criticized the new commission for not lowering rates enough, while on the
other side, business groups and fledgling townships complained that the regulations were
stifling commerce and progress. Railroad leaders took this opportunity to quash the
commission’s authority. In 1883, after a vigorous battle led by William P. Clyde of the
Richmond and Danville Railroad, the legislature ended the rate making power of the
Railroad Commission.43 The law had passed by a slim margin and Narcisco G. Gonzales,
who would later become a leading Tillman critic, suggested that Clyde had bribed the
black congressmen with free passes.44
From 1883 until Ben Tillman claimed the governor’s office in 1890, the railroads
conducted their business unhindered by any effectual state regulation. Had the conditions
of farmers not declined so precipitously until that point, the railroad question may have
been an insignificant issue to Tillman. Conditions, however, were ripe for unrest—as
evident by the election of Tillman, the agricultural “Moses”—and Tillman proceeded to
attack the railroads as oppressors of the agrarian class whom he championed. Farmers
were ready to hold someone accountable for their plight, which over the last decade had
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been worsening. South Carolina historian Walter Edgar, who is a stern critic of the
Tillman movement, acknowledges “drought, army worms, and crop failures followed
one another like the plagues of ancient Egypt . . . . [and] in just two years [1886-7] almost
8 percent of all farmland went on the auction block” because farm owners could not pay
their taxes.45 With the economic depression, the ills of Mother Nature, and the deluge of
tax-related foreclosures it is understandable that farmers would rally behind their
champion taking on the railroads.
During his inaugural address in 1890 Governor Tillman proclaimed that the
“imposition and injustice” of the railroads on society was an evil from which the people
begged relief. Although he stressed the need for better regulation of the deleterious
shipping rates on the common farmer, Tillman showed prudence in not attacking the
railroads with the ferocity with which he had assaulted his Conservative predecessors
during his campaign. Rather, he assured the people of the state that “in seeking to control
the railroads and other corporations strict regard should be had for their rights and
interests.”46 Tillman understood that railroads were crucial to the economic success of
the state, especially to farmers. Therefore an unnecessarily brutal attack on the railroads
would benefit no one. According to Tillman, “much of the material development and
progress of the age is the fruit of corporate efforts, and many men acting under one head
and guided by one will have done for our country what no individual could have possibly
accomplished.”47 Evidently, corporations did not have to be the enemy; they just needed
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to be checked in order to keep them from evolving into the dreaded “octopus” that would
devour the common man. This is where Tillman distinguished himself from more
radical Farmers’ Alliance proponents and Populists. Rather than calling for the deprivatization of railroads and telegraphs, Tillman proposed a more reasonable and
realistic goal of rate regulation that would benefit farmers and other shippers without
crippling the railroad industry or turning it over to the federal government.
As in the case of the phosphate industry, Tillman not only wanted to reduce
shipping rates, but to shift the tax burden off farmers and onto the corporations that were
better equipped to shoulder it. He proposed to “sav[e] the people money, reduc[e] and
equaliz[e] taxes . . . [and create] a good railroad law, administered by an honest,
impartial, and fearless Commission.”48 Unlike the phosphate case, however, Tillman
encountered more problems passing a railroad law that he deemed suitable. Most
historians of the Tillman era concur that the initial failure to enact an efficient railroad
law during his first year in office was due to the legislature balking at his “strong-arm
tactics.”49 They maintain that the only issue was Tillman’s disagreement with the
legislature over the appointment procedure of the members of the proposed railroad
commission; i.e. Tillman wanted the authority to appoint the commissioners, instead of
conceding that power to the legislature.50 While this may have been one reason for the
delay, there were other legitimate problems that historians have either mistakenly
overlooked or willingly ignored.
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When Tillman addressed the legislature in November 1891, he cited reasons for
his failure to sign the proposed railroad bill other than who would have authority to
appoint commissioners. His first complaint was the lack of a provision to prevent the
consolidation of competing lines. Tillman insisted that, “the absorption by lease or
otherwise has gone on until virtually there are only four railroad systems in the State.”51
He proclaimed that as new lines were constructed, they were being bought or leased by
bigger corporations; in his opinion, this systematic elimination of competition placed an
unbearable cost on communities that had gone into debt to help finance competing lines,
but were left “without the benefit of competition.”52 Since the end of the Civil War, local
governments had provided financial aid to railroads in order to induce them to build lines
in their direction. All city or county aid that took the form of bond issues or public stock
subscriptions required approval by the state legislature. From 1865 to 1900 the state
endorsed 117 acts permitting local governments to assist railroads.53 Hence the
monopolization of lines by larger corporations ensured that municipal and county
governments would pay whatever the most powerful railroads desired. In 1890 there
were nine companies operating railroads in South Carolina; while this number may
ostensibly appear to suggest a healthy amount of competition, in actuality five of those
companies were owned or controlled by the Richmond and Danville system.54 Tillman
51
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and his followers believed that although these railroads might be operating under
different corporate names, they were in fact all fingers from the same avaricious hand.
Significantly, all of the roads controlled by the Richmond and Danville were located in
the Upcountry, where Tillman’s greatest support resided.
In addition to relieving the state of “the oppression always incident to
monopolies,” Tillman also disputed the railroads’ complaints that overvaluation of their
assets had encumbered them with unreasonable taxes. In 1891 a new assessment of
railroad property by the state Railroad Board of Equalization increased by $8,000,000
their worth from the previous year.55 Tillman estimated that this would result in a
$100,000 increase in the amount of taxes to be paid by the railroads, and he adamantly
explained why the heavier taxation would not injure the companies. Moreover, he
proclaimed that the job of assessing railroad property should fall to the railroad
commission, and not the current board, which was composed of the State Treasurer,
Comptroller General, Secretary of State, and Attorney General. According to Tillman,
these men were less capable of a realistic assessment than the railroad commissioners
who were more knowledgeable of the industry.56
Tillman’s two principal arguments against the malcontent railroads were that
South Carolina railroads were overcharging passengers and shippers, and that the real
value of the railroads’ property—even with the recently increased assessment—was still
Carolina. Those roads not under outside control were the Savannah and Charleston, the South
Carolina, the Northeastern, and the Wilmington and Manchester—these all ran through
Charleston and/or Columbia. See Cooper, p.118 for an informative map of South Carolina
railroads in 1890.
55
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“far from being their actual value.”57 Since several railroads had failed to report their
earnings for the year, Tillman used the 1890 figure of $2,552,666.97 as the starting point
for his argument. This was the revenue generated by passenger fares alone. The rates
had cost South Carolina travelers three and a half cents per mile, which Tillman noted
was a half-cent more than the rates in Georgia. Conceding that Georgia railroads did
more volume than those in South Carolina and could therefore afford to charge less,
Tillman still maintained that the South Carolina rates were one-seventh more expensive
than necessary. The one-seventh difference over a fair passenger rate, Tillman
concluded, earned the railroads $364,666 in 1890; therefore, they should easily be
capable of paying the $100,000 increase in taxes.58
While a new bill was being discussed in the legislature, railroad leaders—despite
the seemingly obvious futility of their request—implored the governor to veto any
measure that would authorize the railroad commission to set passenger rates or joint rates
between connecting roads.59 The railroad officials insisted that although their expenses
had remained constant, their revenues, especially those for fertilizer shipping and
passenger fares, had decreased significantly due to the agricultural depression. Fearing a
loss of their jobs or a crippling drop in wages, between 8,000 and 10,000 railroad workers
joined the magnates in petitioning the governor to veto rate setting measures. Tillman
assured railroad men that neither he nor the legislature had any intent on unfairly injuring
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their business; he also suggested that any ill will towards them was the result of their
employer’s refusal to pay a fair share of taxes. The Governor forcefully declared that
their complaints meant little compared to the roughly 60,000 farmers who supported the
approval of rate-making measures. Narcisco G. Gonzales, editor of the Columbia State
newspaper vilified Tillman for his stance and labeled him the leader of a political
“faction.”60 Over the objections of Conservatives and railroad men, the bill passed, and
created in 1892 a three-person commission with the authority to examine the railroads’
books and tariffs, and most importantly the power to fix rates. Tillman did yield on his
former insistence that the governor should have the power to appoint the commissioners;
the new law stipulated that the three commission members would be initially selected by
the legislature and thereafter, by popular vote of the citizenry, a common progressive-era
response.61 The new Railroad Law also demonstrated Tillman’s sensibility while proving
the doomsayers wrong. The legislature appointed conservative men to the commission,
and capital was not crippled or forced out of the state. According to Tillman’s most
notable biographer, “South Carolina had merely been given a railroad law like that
already possessed by progressive Western states.”62
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During the railroad officials’ and workers’ petition to the governor to veto the
rate-making measure, the issue of the increased taxes due to a new property value
assessment had not disappeared. Tillman refused to back down, but so did the railroads.
The companies eventually refused to pay the new taxes and filed suit in federal court to
nullify the state’s decision.63 The process by which the tax revenues were collected was
somewhat indirect. First, county treasurers were to collect the duties, and then they were
to be forwarded to the comptroller general and the state treasurer. Therefore, the
railroads technically filed their suit against multiple county treasurers, including those of
Berkley, Williamsburg and Florence counties.64 Eventually, the suits were combined into
the case of Walter v. Northeastern Railroad Company, which made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. As in the case against the Coosaw Mining Company, the court ruled in
favor of the state, directing the railroads to recognize the new property assessments made
by the Railroad Board of Equalization and to pay the additional taxes. While this might
have gone down as a solid victory for the Tillman camp, the triumph proved ephemeral.65
The Richmond and Danville Railroad, the state’s largest carrier, and the South
Carolina Railway refused to pay the increased taxes on the basis that they were formally
held in receivership, and thus were not subject to additional assessments. The courts
investigated and discovered that receivers held 1,410 of the state’s 2,552 miles of
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railroads. Consequently, Federal Judge Charles H. Simonton sent out an injunction
prohibiting county sheriffs from issuing the new levies on the property held by receivers.
Tillman was incensed at the railroads’ refusal to comply as well as the court’s approval
and assistance of behavior that to him reeked of capitalistic greed and oppression. In a
letter to multiple county sheriffs he railed against “the unholy alliance between the
dignity of the Federal courts and these harlot corporations,” and ordered them to
confiscate and hold the property of the recalcitrant companies. Judge Simonton, with the
aid of Judge Nathan Goff, countered the governor’s measure by ordering the sheriffs to
pay a $500 fine or face prison time. The state appealed the convictions of the sheriffs,
but the U.S. Supreme Court ruled this time against Tillman, sustaining the railroads’
claims that those in receivership did not have to pay the increased taxes.66 Tillman did
manage to collect the new taxes from those railroads not held by receivers, but overall the
battle against the railroads had been a net loss for the state. South Carolina was forced to
pay the fines on the sheriffs that had violated Federal law on Tillman’s orders, and had
also incurred $4,000 of legal fees. The situation was even worse for those counties that
had lost great amounts of revenue during the standoff—some had even had to close down
public schools due to treasury short falls.67
Tillman did not accept defeat at the hands of the federal government gracefully;
he spewed invective at the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision with the same vehemence that
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he had attacked the Conservative “ring” during his campaign stump speeches. With
rhetoric not dissimilar from the nullification and secession crises that had aroused the ire
of previous generations of South Carolinians, Tillman castigated the “fungoid growth of
modern judicial precedent. . . .[that had] spread and grown with the rapidity of a banyan
tree in the tropical jungles of Asia, until it now overshadows the land and blights the
sovereignty of the States.”68 He specifically attacked Federal Judge Goff as a
carpetbagger, and Judge Simonton as an effete Charleston dandy who had “sucked
State’s rights with his mother’s milk, and now plants his dagger in the State’s breast.”69
Tillman’s actions in the railroad battle—i.e. the defiance of what he saw as the
marriage between big capital and the federal government—won him a mixed reception
within the state. The railroad-friendly Charleston News and Courier labeled Tillman’s
resistance of the courts “states rights gone mad.” As usual, the majority of the state’s
newspapers sided with industry and capital, and vilified Tillman. On the other hand, the
Farmers’ Alliance state newspaper, the Cotton Plant, vindicated Tillman’s deeds as being
“exactly right.” One reform legislator echoed the Alliance stance by saying that “we
either have to control the railroads or they control us.” This statement, while not exactly
promoting government operation of the railroads, is strikingly similar to the third plank of
the Populist Party’s 1892 Omaha platform, which stated, “We believe that the time has
come when the railroad corporations will either own the people or the people must own
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the railroads.”70 Even Tillman’s most vehement critic among current scholars, Stephen
Kantrowitz, concedes that Tillman’s actions were strategic and did indeed secure support
among his base of followers. As he writes, “Tillman understood the political value of
defiance of federal authority, even when it failed, and his aggressive style and choice of
targets endeared him to those for whom the money power was a palpable enemy.”71
From his position as governor, Ben Tillman, although still a Democrat by name,
forcefully attacked the oppressors of the downtrodden farmer. These were the same
monopolistic moneyed interests and do-nothing conservatives whom he had verbally
assaulted during his campaign and earlier speeches against the old regime. Though he
was not nearly as radical or socialistic as many Populist leaders, by taking on big
corporations perceived as enemies to the common farmer, Tillman provided his
constituency with reason to believe he was a legitimate and progressive reformer, and
thus effectively co-opted the third-party momentum that was building in other Southern
and Western states.
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CONCLUSION

On November 28, 1894, as the end of his tenure in the South Carolina governor’s
office approached , and what would be a long stretch in the U. S. Senate was about to
commence, Benjamin Tillman outlined to the General Assembly the virtues of his career
to that point. He insisted that “reforms of a radical nature have been accomplished; [and]
abuses of long standing have been corrected, or attempted to be corrected.” Tillman
contended that he and his reform faction had, through the promotion of more inclusive
democracy, better education, and temperance, improved the state and the happiness of its
citizens. Furthermore, he asserted that his two terms in office would “mark an epoch in
our annals to which the future historian of the State must devote more than a passing
glance.”72
Tillman’s adieu to the state’s executive office exhibited both prescience and
overstatement. Historians have definitely taken more than a “passing glance” at the
controversial figure’s career, as well as the socio-political climate surrounding it.
Nevertheless, scholarly interpretations of the Tillman movement have varied
significantly. Tillman’s most notable biographer, Francis B. Simkins, insisted that
farmer’s champion “cannot be judged according to the standards of social and economic
amelioration prevailing in more recent times in more progressive communities,” and that
“according to the standards of his day, [Tillman] was the most successful governor South
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Carolina has ever had.”73 The more recent historiography, however, has not been so kind
to the Edgefield agitator.

Historians Walter Edgar and Stephen Kantrowitz have not

only criticized Tillman for his contributions to the systemization of white supremacy, but
also attempted to dispel his credentials as a reformer for white farmers. They contend
that Tillman was essentially a conservative political boss, who employed reform rhetoric
to secure office. Additionally, historians of the Populist Party, including Lawrence
Goodwyn and Robert C. McMath Jr., have agreed that Tillman and the vast majority of
South Carolinians resisted the third party on the basis that it would possibly lead to
political and social equality for African Americans.
Tillman may not have been as “radical” as he claimed; he was opposed to largescale federal intervention programs like those advocated by the Farmers’ Alliance and the
Populist Party. He disapproved of the sub-treasury plan and government ownership of
railroads and telegraphs, insisting that these proposals were too socialistic. Ideally,
Tillman believed in the Jeffersonian doctrine of self-sufficiency and minimal government
interference. Nevertheless, he did not oppose government power to improve conditions
and eliminate inequities imposed by big capital on individuals, especially farmers.
Tillman fought and destroyed the monopoly of the Coosaw Mining Company, which he
insisted had deprived the state of its due phosphate royalties by denying fair competition.
He also established a Railroad Commission with the power to set freight and passenger
rates—exorbitant shipping rates were one of the most prominent complaints of the
economically burdened farmers.
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Tillman showed genuine concern and skill in reforming both the state Penitentiary
and the Lunatic Asylum. In each institution his efforts improved the economic efficiency
as well as the living conditions of the residents. Additionally, Tillman created the state
liquor dispensary, which proved to be a practical solution to the heated contention
between prohibitionists and liquor advocates. The dispensary not only curbed rampant
saloon life and its concomitant evils, it also provided a boon to the state’s coffers that
resulted in decreased taxation for state farmers. Furthermore, when dispensary foes
rioted in Darlington, Tillman’s swift and judicious management of the situation won him
praise from leaders across the country, as well as from his traditional enemies within the
state.
In his calls for reform preceding his campaign for the governor’s chair, Tillman
achieved two of his most memorable accomplishments, creation of Clemson Agricultural
College and establishment of the primary system for nominating candidates within the
South Carolina Democratic Party. The primary system became a permanent institution,
and helped to break the aristocratic “ring rule” over the Democratic Party by forcing the
potential candidates to appear before the mass of common voters. Tillman counted the
creation of Clemson College as one of his most important legacies. The school gave
South Carolina a tool by which to train its farmers in modern, scientific methods of
efficient and profitable agriculture. Furthermore, it was an important symbol that
represented a step up for the agricultural classes against their perceived enemies, the
genteel aristocrats who usually identified with South Carolina College and The Citadel.
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Also, Tillman was influential in the creation of Winthrop College, South Carolina’s first
institution of higher education for women.
Historians may be correct in asserting that Tillman was not a “radical,” but they
are mistaken to propose that he was not a reformer. Recent scholars have downplayed
the previously discussed reform measures, and instead emphasized Tillman’s whitesupremacist ideology as a way of discrediting the entirety of his program. By modern
standards Tillman’s racial views are unacceptable, but for the time and place in which he
lived they were the standard. The Conservative regime that Tillman and his supporters
usurped had no intent of promoting racial equality. Kantrowitz, however, points to
Greenbackers and would-be Populists like Hendrix McLane, who did seek bi-racial
cooperation for radical reform, as evidence that there were South Carolinians interested
in such measures. He claims that it was the Tillman movement and its insistency on the
continuing power of “white manhood” that prevented interracial cooperation.
Kantrowitz, however, underplays just how negligible a percentage of South Carolinians
favored political cooperation with African Americans. In fact, Hendrix McLane reflected
the exact opposite of what the overwhelming majority of South Carolina citizens wanted,
regardless of whether they were Tillman supporters or his enemies.
Modern scholars also argue that to conclude that Tillman was a reformer, because
he represented the majority of white citizens, is to unjustly deny African American
citizens their rightful and equal ownership of the state and its government. This
contention, however “enlightened” it appears to be, is still faulty because it is
anachronistic. Historians and students of the Tillman era in South Carolina cannot
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legitimately interpret nineteenth century scenarios, much less judge them, by modern
standards of racial equality that were essentially non-existent at the time. Historians
often make the mistake of concentrating on what should have been, rather than what was.
Benjamin Tillman was a product of the society in which he lived. Furthermore, the
majority of those people who professed shock at Tillman’s rhetoric were not grieved by
the matter of what he spoke, but by the ungentlemanly manner in which he spoke it.
What modern scholars feel should have been is merely academic; the fact is that the
majority of white South Carolinians believed African Americans should not be on an
equal socio-political footing with whites.
The existence of racial disparity was certainly not unique to South Carolina. In
the 1890’s every Southern and Western state that experienced a third-party movement
also incurred the controversy of cooperating with black voters. Those state populist
movements that did seek the African –American vote did so out of necessity, a lack of
alternative options. Moreover, in addition to the stigma attached to bi-racial cooperation,
the idea of abandoning one’s traditional party carried significant drawbacks, including
potential exclusion from the business community and rejection from friends and family.
Therefore, Tillman’s reform movement in South Carolina provided white citizens,
especially farmers, with an outlet for their political angst, without the need for leaving
their traditional party or indulging in schemes for major federal intervention. His
tangible reforms in education, fighting monopolies, reforming state institutions, and
regulating railroads were a legitimate alternative to third-party radicalism.
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In 1892, during Tillman’s reelection campaign for the governorship, the antiTillman State newspaper began a satirical series deriding the incumbent. The
“Chronicles of Zeracchaboan,” as the series was titled, began thusly: “Now in the fullness
of time arose one Benjamin, a man haughty of spirit and subtle of heart, who greatly
deceived the people. The same was spoken of by the Prophet, saying ‘A one-eyed man
shall be king among the blind.’”74 While the intent behind these “chronicles” may have
been simply a humorous jibe at a political opponent, an explication of its language
reveals the foundation for the loyalty Tillman engendered. The State was an organ—
officially created by Narcisco G. Gonzales to denounce the Tillman movement—that was
synonymous with the aristocratic elites of Columbia and the Lowcountry. When the
newspaper suggested that Tillman devotees—primarily from the Upcountry—had been
“deceived,” and were furthermore “blind,” it disclosed just how little respect the
Conservative clique had for the common citizens. Ben Tillman may not have endorsed
radical programs of federal intervention, and never considered joining the Populist Party.
Nevertheless, he was a legitimate reformer on nearly every concern, and he represented
the people of South Carolina more than any of their previous governments had even
considered. Consequently, South Carolina experienced almost no Populist activity not
because of the fear of racial equality, but rather because it already had a bona fide
reformer within the Democratic Party before Populism was an option.
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